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This thesis aims to examine the problems Confucianism encountered in the late 
Warring States period and how Xunzi solved these problems and reconstructed 
Confucianism by incorporating other non-Confucian schools’ teachings.  
 
This thesis examines the problems Confucianism encountered in terms of knowledge, 
human nature and politics. In the aspect of knowledge, Confucius’ broad learning 
became unbalanced and incomplete in Mencius’ teachings, which could not meet the 
need of the time. In contrast, Xunzi argued for a broad learning and borrowed the 
terms xu, yi and jing from Zhuangzi to reconstruct the Confucian teachings about 
knowledge. In the aspect of human nature, Mencius’ view that human xing is good is 
not plausible and could not provide a better basis for Confucian theory of moral 
cultivation and good government. In contrast, Xunzi argued for the view that human 
xing is bad and pointed out the way of cultivating bad human xing to be good. In the 
aspect of politics, Mencius’ teachings could not provide an effective approach for 
attaining the ideal of good government. In contrast, Xunzi argued for li associated 
with fa, which might be borrowed from Shang Yang, as the way for achieving good 
government. This thesis argues that Xunzi not only remained within the Confucian 






What Will We Argue in This Thesis? 
Xunzi, a great thinker living in the late Warring States period of ancient China, 
received many criticisms from Chinese philosophers, including Confucian scholars. 
Contrary to the various criticisms and suspicions of Xunzi’s Confucian identity, in this 
dissertation, I will argue that Xunzi is a Confucian who not only adhered to the 
teachings of Confucius, but also improved the Confucian teachings to a great extent. 
Without the effort of Xunzi, it is hard to imagine that Confucianism could prevail over 
other intellectual thoughts and flourish in later generations.1 
Basically, this dissertation will argue for the following theses: 
1. Xunzi not only continued but improved Confucius’ teachings; 
2. Xunzi improved Confucianism by incorporating the thought of other schools 
of Chinese philosophy; 
3. Xunzi incorporated the thought of other schools in order to strengthen 
Confucianism theoretically and thereby make it more persuasive and practical 
for his times in order to achieve the Confucian moral and political ideals more 
effectively. 
This dissertation will elucidate the above with a detailed philosophical study of the 
text of Xunzi that compares it with other texts from the Warring States period. From 
the detailed textual comparison between the Xunzi and other texts, we could see the 
                                                        
1 Confucianism, Taoism, Mohism and Legalism are the conventional English terms for the various schools of 
thought in the East Zhou period, although the schools were so identified only from the Han Dynasty onwards. 
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similarities between Xunzi and these non-Confucians in terms of some important 
issues and how non-Confucian teaching could be helpful in improving Confucianism 
to be more adaptable to the time and in achieving Confucian moral and political 
ideals.  
As many commentators and thinkers have noticed, Xunzi not only inherited the 
Confucian tradition, but also integrated other philosophical traditions, such as Taoism, 
Mohism and Legalism, into his own philosophy. This may be the reason why Xunzi is 
easily misunderstood to be a non-Confucian. However, in my view, Xunzi did not 
become a non-Confucian just because of his incorporation of other schools’ teachings. 
In fact, Xunzi’s incoroporation of these other schools’ teachings was for the purpose 
of improving Confucianism. I shall examine in detail these other schools’ influences 
on Xunzi and see how they improve Confucianism. 
An interesting question emerges here: why did Xunzi integrate these other 
thoughts from very different philosophical traditions, even traditions explicitly 
opposed to Confucianism? If they are for the improvement of Confucianism, what are 
the problems in Confucianism he intended them to solve? From the second to fourth 
chapter, I will investigate and assess the nature of these problems and Xunzi’s 
solutions. The problems of Confucian teachings include its theories of knowing, 
human xing, and politics, to which most of its important teachings are related.  
Confucianism is a practice-oriented school concerned with cultivating people to 
be moral and formulating a good government and an orderly society. As various 
sayings in the Analects indicate, it is important to apply one’s moral learning or 
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knowledge.2 In this sense, its theories must be plausible enough to be put into 
practice.  
Confucian teachings of knowing encountered a series of problems in the late 
Warring States period. For example, Mencius’ teachings of knowing premised on 
good human xing (human nature) and focusing on moral relationships could not 
secure a good socio-political order in a time of chaos and disorders, not to mention the 
attainment of Confucian ideals. The frequent wars and miserable living conditions 
made it especially hard for people to believe that human beings are good in nature, as 
Mencius claimed. More importantly, it is really difficult to expect a person to cultivate 
himself to be moral without any external compulsion. As to political teachings, 
Mencius could not provide an effective approach to achieve a good government ruled 
by a sage king in the late Warring States period. Thus, these problems reflect one 
common problem: Confucianism has lost touch with the reality of the late Warring 
States period. To improve Confucianism and achieve Confucian ideals, its theoretical 
assumptions as well as arguments for moral cultivation and good government need to 
be revised to be more realistic. Otherwise, Confucianism could not even survive, not 
to mention flourish. In this dissertation, I will show how the need to revise and 
improve Confucianism led Xunzi to integrate other schools’ teachings on knowledge, 
human nature and politics into Confucian teachings. 
The problems of Confucianism in the late Warring States period and the solutions 
Xunzi provided are very important for scholarship since they touch on important 
                                                        
2 Refer to D. C. Lau, trans., The Analects (London: The Penguin Group, Penguin Books, 1979), 1.1, also 6.23. 
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questions in the history of Confucianism, with implications for contemporary 
understanding of the tradition. An in-depth study of Xunzi’s improvement on 
Confucianism would help us understand how the Confucian tradition evolved in its 
long history to become a predominant intellectual tradition in ancient China. Xunzi’s 
method of incorporating non-Confucian thought is one that has been repeatedly used 
in a tradition that has weathered the changes of more than two millennia. Some 
contemporary works on Xunzi have acknowledged that Xunzi incorporated some 
non-Confucian teachings into his own teachings. However, the reason why Xunzi did 
so is inadequately explained. Is it out of arbitrary personal preference? Or is it to 
improve Confucian teachings? If it is to improve Confucian teachings, Confucian 
teachings must have encountered some problems that need to be solved. If so, what 
are these problems and what elicit or exacerbate these problems? Could Xunzi’s 
strategy effectively and successfully solve these problems? These questions, 
unfortunately, are not fully and effectively answered in current scholarship.   
Xunzi’s stragtegy of solving the Confucian problems in the late Warring States 
period, such as his emphasis of li and fa, provided an important pattern for modeling a 
Confucian society in the contemporary world. Although the situation is different from 
the time Xunzi lived in, Xunzi’s approach in bringing about or maintaining a good 
social order is especially important for our time, which is still endangered by the 
occasional wars and conflicts. In addition, the problems Confucianism encountered is 
not specific to the late Warring States period. The problems lie not in Confucian moral 
and political ideals, which are attractive for the people, but in the approach in 
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achieving the ideals. Whether it is in the late Warring States period or later dynasties, 
the problem of the approach in achieving Confucian ideals would always exist. So, it 
is significant to make an in-depth study on the approaches former Confucians 
including Xunzi assumed and compare their differences, from which we could know 
why the later dynasties followed Xunzi’s approach in governing. In this case, this 
thesis will also contribute to the understanding of the political system in ancient China. 
However, due to the differences among former Confucians and Xunzi, not all 
philosophers thought that Xunzi’s doctrine was still Confucian.  
 
Debate on Xunzi’s Confucian Status 
Xunzi’s Confucian status is a matter of debate among later scholars. In the Han 
Dynasty, Sima Qian, the prominent historian of Han Dynasty, regarded Xunzi as the 
great Confucian after Mencius. In the Shi Ji, he juxtaposed the biography of Xunzi 
with that of Mencius and praised Xunzi for condemning the turbulent politics in the 
late Warring States period and dispelling the superstition prevailing in his time. The 
most important contribution attributed to Xunzi was his detailed review of the success 
and failure of Confucianism, Mohism, and Daoism in his extensive works.3 In the 
view of Sima Qian, Xunzi realized that Confucianism had been endangered due to the 
misinterpretations of mediocre Confucian followers. Some non-Confucians, such as 
Zhuangzi, also posed a challenge to Confucianism. Xunzi felt that it was his own 
responsibility to defend and reconstruct Confucianism and refute other schools’ 
                                                        
3 See Sima Qian 司馬遷, Shi Ji 史記, vol. 74 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959), p. 2348. 
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challenges. In the preface of Shi Ji, Sima Qian argued that Xunzi’s teachings clarified 
general rationales of rituals and moral principles. Han Confucians regarded Xunzi as 
very important in transmitting and interpreting the Confucian classical texts. Due to 
Xunzi’s emphasis on learning the classics, which include the Documents (Shang Shu), 
Odes (Shi Jing), Rituals (Li), Music (Yue), and Spring and Autumn Annals (Chun Qiu), 
Confucianism in Han dynasty established the tradition of studying classics, which is 
later called Jing Xue經學 or Han Xue 漢學. For this reason, Liu Xiang wrote a book 
to evaluate Xunzi’s position in the history of Confucianism, in which he argued that 
only Xunzi and Mencius could respect and inherit the teachings of Confucius.4  
During the Song and Ming dynasties, when generally Xunzi was condemned as a 
legalist while Mencius was admired as a true Confucian, there were still some 
scholars who defended Xunzi’s Confucian identity. For example, Gui Youguang, a 
scholar in Ming Dynasty, regarded Xunzi as the only Confucian who was capable of 
understanding the teachings of Confucius in the late Warring States period. In this 
case, Xunzi should be regarded equally important as Mencius in the history of 
Confucianism.5 Another famous scholar Li Zhi argued that Xunzi’s teachings were 
wiser than those of Mencius and not pedantic. Xunzi followed the teachings of 
Confucius with his unique style. Xunzi was also listed as one of the top virtuous 
Confucians by Li Zhi.6 
In Qing dynasty, textual research focusing on studying the classics became 
                                                        
4 Liu Xiang 劉向, “Sunqing shulu 孫卿書錄,” in Yan Kejun (ed.), Quan shanggusandai qinhan sanguo liuchao 
wen 全上古三代秦漢三國六朝文, vol. 1 (Taipei: World Book, 1969).  
5 Gui Youguang歸有光, “Xunzi xulu 荀子敘錄,” in Zhenchuan xiansheng ji 震川先生集, vol. 1 (Shanghai: 
Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1981), p. 20. 
6 Li Zhi 李贄, “Xun Qing 荀卿,” in Xuxiu siku quanshu 續修四庫全書, vol.302 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji 
chubanshe, 1995), pp. 219-221. 
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prevalent. Generally, Qing scholars studying the classics preferred Han Xue, which 
emphasized textual evidence and practical attitude in learning, in direct contrast to 
Song-Ming Confucianism, which focused on speculative thinking and disputations. In 
such intellectual context, Xunzi’s teachings were stressed. Wang Zhong wrote two 
books, Xunqingzi tonglun, and Xunqingzi nianbiao, which focused on discussing the 
relationship between Xunzi and Confucius, and regarded Xunzi as an inheritor of the 
teachings of Confucius. 7  Dai Zhen, another famous scholar in Qing Dynasty, 
regarded Xunzi as different from Laozi, Zhuangzi and Gaozi; instead, he was affirmed 
as a follower of Confucius.8 
Although these scholars regarded Xunzi as a great Confucian after Confucius 
and Mencius, there have been different opinions on his Confucian identity. Han Yu, a 
Confucian in Tang Dynasty, claimed that there were no great Confucians after 
Mencius, and Xunzi did not inherit the teachings of Confucius. Zhu Xi, a Confucian 
in Song Dynasty, even condemned Xunzi as a representative of Legalism. He once 
told his students that they should not pay heed to Xunzi but only need to focus on 
Mencius. In Zhu Xi’s view, Xunzi did not know the way of Confucianism since he 
only focused on law and punishment in his teachings, as seen in his book Cheng 
Xiang. Thus, Xunzi was not a Confucian.9 This dissertation tries to show how biased 
and inaccurate this view is. 
                                                        
7 Wang Zhong 汪中, “Xunzi tonglun荀卿子通論,” in Beijing tushuguan cangzhenben nianpu congkan 北京圖
書館藏珍本年譜叢刊, vol.5 (Beijing: Beijing Library Press, 1999), pp. 622-625; “Xunqingzi niaobiao 荀卿子年
表,” in Beijing tushuguan cangzhenben nianpu congkan 北京圖書館藏珍本年譜叢刊, vol.5 (Beijing: Beijing 
Library Press, 1999), pp. 613-622. 
8 Dai Zhen 戴震, “Xuyan 緒言,” in Congshu jicheng xinbian 叢書集成新編, vol. 23 (Taipei: Shin Wen Feng 
Print, 1984), p. 655. 
9 Zhu Xi 朱熹, Zhuzi yulei 朱子語類, vol.137 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), pp. 3253-3255. 
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Some current Chinese scholars also claim that Xunzi is not a Confucian just 
because of his incorporation of some non-Confucian teachings. Those making this 
claim would have us believe that Xunzi incorporated some non-Confucian teachings 
for the sake of developing non-Confucian teachings instead of improving 
Confucianism. Zhao Jihui, for example, argues that Xunzi is a representative of 
Huang-Lao learning, a special development in the history of Daoism.10 Zhao argues 
that Xunzi’s teachings did not adhere to that of Confucius and Mencius. The 
opposition between Mencius and Xunzi especially shows that Xunzi deviated from 
the Confucian course. In this case, since Xunzi’s teachings were similar to 
Huang-Lao’s teachings in some aspects, he should be regarded as a representative of 
Huang-Lao school. Zhao’s argument, however, is very superficial and arbitrary, since 
his comparisons only focus on the difference in the terms they used while neglecting 
how Xunzi employed non-Confucian terms to solve Confucian problems and make 
Confucian points. Thus, Zhao’s partial interpretation of Xunzi’s text is very 
problematic.  
Other Chinese scholars, such as Yu Mingguang, are more careful in defining 
Xunzi’s status. In an article translated into English, after comparing the similarities 
between the teachings of Xunzi and Huang-Lao school, Yu argues as follows, 
    To sum up, even though Xunzi was a prominent Confucian scholar of the late 
Warring States period, his philosophy contained much of the quintessence of 
Daoist culture. The outworn and declining character of Confucianism of the late 
                                                        
10 Refer to Zhao Jihui 趙吉惠, “Lun Xunzi shi jixiahuanglao zhixue 論荀學是稷下黃老之學,” Daojia wenhua 
yanjiu 道家文化研究, no. 4, 1997. 
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Warring States period made Xunzi take up the historical task of reforming and 
reviving Confucianism. Therefore, beginning with Xunzi, Confucianism 
extensively assimilated Daoist culture and, in particular, the ideas of the Daoist 
Huang-Lao school of thought, and absorbed their best achievements. Thus, a 
Confucian “theory of the Way” was created, opening new ways for the renewal 
of Confucianism. “Confucianist appearance, Daoist contents” became 
characteristic of the new Confucianism.11 
Yu’s conclusion is not so radical as that of Zhao and probably is more accurate than 
Zhao’s judgment on Xunzi. However, the claim of “Confucianist appearance, Daoist 
contents” overshoots the mark. I shall argue that Xunzi did not become a Daoist while 
appearing to be a Confucian. On the contrary, Daoist thought is only part of the 
“appearance”, while Confucianism is the real “content” of his teachings. Yu’s view 
overstates the influence of Daoism on Xunzi. Aside from Daoism, there are probably 
other non-Confucian thoughts influencing him, such as Shang Yang’s teachings 
(which were later identified as Legalism) and Mozi’s teachings. All these 
non-Confucian teachings, although influencing Xunzi to different extents, did not 
become the core of Xunzi’s thoughts, which remained Confucian. Thus, although 
some scholars have touched on the issue of Xunzi’s assimilation of non-Confucian 
teachings, an in-depth and careful study focusing on a detailed comparison of the text 
of Xunzi with the texts from other traditions that influenced him has yet to be 
undertaken.  
                                                        
11 Yu Mingguang, “Xunzi’s Philosophy and the School of Huang-Lao,” Contemporary Chinese Thought, vol. 34, 
no.1, 2002, p. 60. 
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Li Zehou, a Chinese scholar, makes an acute assessment on Xunzi’s Confucian 
status: 
From Song-Ming Confucianism to Modern Neo-Confucianism, Xunzi was 
usually criticized and Mencius praised accordingly. They thought the course 
from Zhu Xi, Wang Yangming to Mencius was the mainstream and orthodoxy of 
history of Chinese thought. However, the studies on Xunzi in the past thirty years 
in this country either merely praised Xunzi’s materialism or simply criticized his 
legalist inclination which respects the rulers and exalts the rituals (zunjun shangli 
尊君尚禮). All these scholars seemed not to grasp the pith of Xunzi’s teachings. 
Although Mencius had a splendid aspect, however, if Confucianism followed 
Mencius’ course totally, it was quite possible that Confucianism would lapse into 
mysticism and religion. It is because Xunzi emphasized the conscious effort of 
human beings, and radically opposed Mencius’ view of human nature as good 
with his naturalistic view of human nature as bad that the mystical inclination in 
Confucianism was overcome and diluted. At the same time, since Xunzi tried to 
assimilate the rational and practical factor from the teachings of Mohism, 
Daoism, and Legalism, Confucianism was greatly enhanced in terms of 
emphasizing conscious effort of human beings and society. In this case, the 
optimistic ideal of human life in Confucianism is exalted to the cosmological 
level of “triad with Heaven and Earth”.12   
Li’s comment on Xunzi is quite accurate and realizes the importance of Xunzi in the 
                                                        
12 Li Zehou 李澤厚, Zhongguo sixiangshi lun 中國思想史論, vol. 1 (Hefei: Anhui wenyi chubanshe, 1999), pp. 
124-125. Translation mine. 
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history of Chinese thought. In this dissertation, I will argue in more detail why it is so. 
 
Who is a True Confucian? 
To see if Xunzi is a Confucian or not, we should make clear the meaning and possible 
implications of the term “Confucian,” which is the English term used to refer to a 
group the Chinese called ru (儒). The Ru school of teachings could be traced back to a 
much earlier time than Confucius.  
The Ru wear round caps on their heads to show that they understand the cycles 
of heaven, that they walk about in square shoes to show that they understand the 
shape of the earth, and they tie ornaments in the shape of a broken disc at their 
girdles in order to show that, when the time comes for decisive action, they must 
‘make the break.’13 
This description indicates a broader understanding of Ru than the followers of 
Confucius. The scholars in Han dynasty defined Ru as follows: 
Ru …is the name of the versatile.14 
    A man who understands thoroughly Heaven, Earth and Human could be called 
Ru.15 
According to Hu Shih,16 the term Ru possibly refers to the Yin people, who inherited 
and practiced the ritual knowledge of Yin. It is only when Ru came to be associated 
                                                        
13 Burton Watson, trans. The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu (New York: Columbia Universitvy Press, 1968), 
chap. 21, p. 227. 
14 Xu Shen 許慎, Shuowen jiezi說文解字, Zang Kehe and Wang Ping (eds.) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2002), p. 
519. 
15 Yang Xiong 楊雄, “Fayan法言,” in Xuxiu siku quanshu 續修四庫全書, vol.933 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji 
chubanshe, 1995), p. 306. 
16 Hu Shih 胡適, Shuo Ru 說儒, chap. 2 and 5 (Xian: Shanxi Normal University Press, 2005). 
 12 
with Confucius who had a distinctive teaching that Ru was specifically understood as 
the school of Confucius. Han Fei, a Legalist and disciple of Xunzi in the late Warring 
States period, commented on the history of Ru as follows: 
The peak Ru attained is Confucius; …while afterwards, the Ru divided into eight 
schools.17 
It is the scholars of Han dynasty who equated Ru teachings with Confucius’ teachings.  
Confucius cultivated the Way of Zhou Kings Cheng and Kang (chengkang 
zhidao 成康之道), reiterated the teachings of the Duke of Zhou (zhougong 周
公), to teach seventy disciples. He prompted them to write and revise the 
classical texts and cultivated them to be the pupils of Ru.18 
In the Han Shu, Ban Gu wrote: 
The school of Ru…emphasizes benevolence and rightness, reiterates Yao and 
Shun, emulate Zhou Kings, Wen and Wu, and regards Confucius as the grand 
teacher.19 
Although “Confucianism” is a term invented by the Jesuits and not without 
controversy, I shall use it to refer to the teachings of Confucius and his followers, 
while “Confucians” refers to the followers of Confucius. Han Fei claimed that after 
the death of Confucius, the Confucian camp was divided into eight different branches, 
namely, that of Zizhang, Zisi, Yanshi, Mengshi, Qidiaoshi, Zhongliangshi, Sunshi and 
                                                        
17 D. C. Lau and Chen Fong Ching (eds.), A Concordance to the Hanfeizi (Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 
2000), chap. 50, p. 150. 
18 Xu Kuangyi (ed.), Huainanzi quanyi 淮南子全譯, chap.21 (Guiyang: Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 1993), pp. 
1263-1264. 
19 Ban Gu, Hanshu yiwenzhi 漢書藝文志 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1955), p. 25. 
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Lezhengshi.20 Each of these Confucian schools regarded itself as the true Ru, but in 
Han Fei’s view,  
since we cannot call Confucius and Mo Tzu back to life, who is to decide which 
of the present versions of the doctrine is the right one?21 
Xunzi also criticized contemporaries who called themselves Confucians: 
Their caps bent and twisted, their robes billowing and flowing, they move to and 
fro as though they were a Yu or a Shun—such are the base Ru of Zizhang’s 
school. Wearing their caps in perfectly correct form, maintaining their expression 
in perfect equanimity, they sit there all day long as though they were about to 
gag on a bit, but say nothing—such are the base Ru of the school of Zixia. 
Evasive and timorous, disliking work, lacking integrity, shameless, interested 
only in food and drink, they insist that “a gentleman naturally would not engage 
in manual labor”—such are the base Ru of the school of Ziyou.22 
Obviously, Xunzi did not regard the schools of Zizhang, Zixia and Ziyou as the true 
Ru. Xunzi also criticized the teachings of Zisi and Mencius. 
Some men follow the model of the Ancient Kings in a fragmentary way, but they 
do not understand its guiding principles…Mysterious and enigmatic, it lacks a 
satisfactory theoretical basis. Esoteric and laconic in its statement, it lacks 
adequate explanations… Zisi provided the tune for them, and Mencius 
harmonized it. The stupid, indecisive, deluded Ru of today enthusiastically 
                                                        
20 Burton Watson, Han Fei Tzu: Basic Writings (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 118. 
21 Ibid. 
22 John Knoblock, trans. Xunzi—A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, vol. 1 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1989), 6.13. 
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welcome these notions, unaware that they are false. They pass on what they have 
received, believing that, on account of these theories, Confucius and Zigong 
would be highly esteemed by later generations. This is the error of Zisi and 
Mencius.23 
In Xunzi’s view, the teachings of Zisi, Mencius and other Confucians in his time 
lacked theoretical basis and adequate explanations. In addition, these teachings 
deviated from the original teachings of Confucius and Zi Gong.24 Thus, what are the 
true Ru teachings in Xunzi’s view?  
The Ru model themselves after the Ancient Kings; they exalt ritual and moral 
principles; as ministers and sons they are careful to esteem their superiors to the 
highest degree.25 
In this sense, Xunzi regarded a Confucian as a person who could emulate the way of 
ancient sage kings and exalt the rituals and moral principles. Although Zisi and 
Mencius professed to follow the teachings of Confucius, they did not seem to 
understand or practice them. Thus, in Xunzi’s view, the teachings of Confucius is 
pure and correct; while most later generations who professed to be Confucians could 
not follow the original teachings of Confucius, and interpreted them in aberrant ways. 
Xunzi tried to seek and follow the teachings of true Confucians and analyzed the 
problems encountered by Confucianism to deliver specific solutions to them. 
                                                        
23 Xunzi, vol. 1, 6.7. There is some translation difficulty here: it seems that this passage means that it is the 
deluded Ru who misinterpreted Zisi and Mencius, who are the true Confucians. However, this passage could also 
mean that Zisi, Mencius and the deluded Ru are equally deluded about Confucius’ teachings, that is, the deluded 
Ru are the followers of Zisi and Mencius.  
24 Zi Gong 子弓 is a disciple of Zi Xia 子夏, who is also a disciple of Confucius. The teachings of Zi Gong put 
more stress on studying the classical texts.  
25 John Knoblock, trans. Xunzi—A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, vol. 2 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1990), 8.2. 
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Many Han dynasty scholars, such as Sima Tan, Liu Xiang and Ban Gu, had set 
forth their opinions about the defining features of Confucianism. According to Sima 
Tan, Confucianism emphasizes the importance of rituals. 26  For Ban Gu, 
Confucianism is the school that emphasizes the rituals, edification, benevolence, and 
admires the ancient kings and Confucius.27 It seems appropriate that the teachings of 
Confucius, as recorded in the Analects, should define true Confucianism to start with. 
Song-Ming neo-Confucians judged whether one is a Confucian by comparing with 
both Confucius and Mencius, sometimes even favoring Mencius over Confucius. This 
is quite unreasonable as being different from Mencius does not stop one from being a 
Confucian in the sense of being a follower of Confucius. When there is a conflict 
between Mencius and other Confucians, we should prefer Confucius’ teachings in the 
Analects as the guide. But when Confucius is silent on some issues while Mencius 
and other Confucians hold different views, we should examine which addition better 
develop Confucius’ views. In this case, only examining the similarities between 
Confucius and his followers might not be enough to judge the followers’ Confucian 
status. We might also need to allow for the development of Confucius’ teachings in 
the way the implicit thoughts in Analects are brought out and even added to by later 
Confucians. Thus, we may suggest the key characteristics of Confucianism as 
follows: 
1. Follows the teachings of Confucius as recorded in the Analects; 
2. Admires and praises the ancient kings like Yao, Shun, and King Wen and Wu; 
                                                        
26 Sima Tan 司馬談, “Lun liujia yaozhi 論六家要旨,” in Sima Qian 司馬遷, Shi Ji 史記, vol. 130, p. 3289. 
27 Ban Gu 班固, Hanshu yiwenzhi 漢書藝文志, p. 25. 
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3. Advocates benevolence or humane and moral principles; 
4. Advocates rituals; 
5. Emphasizes self-cultivation and education; 
6. Regards Liujing 六經, the six classics, as the basis of learning.  




Although Xunzi’s “Contra Twelve Philosophers” criticized most schools at that time, 
he respected and praised Confucius very highly. Xunzi said, 
Should he once occupy the position of grand officer, a single ruler could not 
keep him to himself, and a single state could not contain him. The greatness of 
his reputation would exceed that of the feudal lords, each of whom would long 
to employ him as their minister. Even such a sage does not always gain a 
position of power. Such were Confucius and Zi Gong.28 
So, in Xunzi’s view, Confucius did not belong to any single state; instead he belonged 
to the world, in which he was the sage king. Thus, “the moral authority of Confucius 
was equal to that of the Duke of Zhou and his reputation was on an equal footing with 
that of the Three Kings.”  
Such a great Ru, … will beat down and crush aggressive states and make 
uniform and united the whole world, and none will be able to overthrow 
                                                        
28 Xunzi, vol.1, 6.8. 
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him—this is evidence of a great Ru…….If he is successful in obtaining office, 
he will unify the world. If he is unsuccessful, he will establish alone a noble 
reputation. Heaven cannot kill it, earth bury it, the age of a Jie or Robber Zhi 
tarnish it. None but a great Ru can establish such a reputation: such were 
Confucius and Zi Gong.29 
Xunzi definitely regarded Confucius as the central figure of Confucianism and the 
sage whom he always admired. 
Second, Xunzi admired the sage kings Yao, Shun and King Wen and King Wu. 
In Xiu Shen, he said, “If you use it (moral principles and being trustworthy) to 
cultivate your character and strengthen your self, you will establish a reputation equal 
to that of Yao or Yu.”30 In the book Wang Ba, he said, 
Tang began with Bo and King Wu with Hao, both territories only a hundred li 
square, yet they unified the world, made the feudal lords their servants, so that 
wherever news of them penetrated there were none who did not submit to them 
and follow after them. This was due to no other cause than that they perfected 
moral principles. This is what is called moral principles being established and 
becoming a universal king.31 
Third, Xunzi always admired and advocated the moral principle of ren 
(benevolence or humaneness). He said, 
These four Ancestors and two kings all marched throughout the whole world 
with an army that was humane and just. Thus, people who were nearby were 
                                                        
29 Xunzi, vol.2, 8.9. 
30 Xunzi, vol.1, 2.2. 
31 Xunzi, vol. 2, 11.1b. 
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attracted by their goodness, and those who were in remote regions longed for 
their justice.32 
He also argued for carrying out benevolence so that the people could live in 
happiness. “Conduct marked by humanity, justice, and inner power is normally the 
method of assuring safety.”33 As for the ritual, Xunzi regarded it as the fundamental 
principle in his philosophy.  
…A lord of men who exalts ritual principles and honors worthy men will 
become a True King…34  
…follow the requirements of ritual principles, good order penetrates every 
aspect of his activity. But when this is not so, then his actions become 
unreasonable and disorderly, dilatory and negligent. Thus, a man without ritual 
will not live; an undertaking lacking ritual will not be completed; and a nation 
without ritual will not be tranquil.35 
Rituals also play an important part in the education that Xunzi argued for.  
A people that is not taught will have no means of introducing rational order into 
their inborn nature. Hence, …The way to guide them is to establish colleges, set 
up academies and schools, cultivate the six types of ritual observances, and 
elucidate the seven teachings.36 
In the chapter, “Man’s Nature is Evil,” he pointed out that education changes a person 
from his or her bad nature to become good.  
                                                        
32 Xunzi, vol. 2, 15.2. 
33 Xunzi, vol. 1, 4.8. 
34 John Knoblock, trans. Xunzi—A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, vol. 3 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1994), 17.9. 
35 Xunzi, vol. 1, 2.2. 
36 Xunzi, vol. 3, 27.52. 
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Now, if the man in the street were induced to cleave to these methods, engage in 
study, focus his mind on a single aim, unify his intentions, ponder these 
principles, accomplish them each day over a long period of time, and to 
accumulate what is good without slacking off, then he could penetrate as far as 
spiritual intelligence and could form a Triad with Heaven and Earth. Thus the 
sage is a man who has reached this high state through accumulated effort.37 
Xunzi also respected the teacher as an important part of education. He said, “When a 
country is on the verge of a great florescence, it is certain to prize its teachers and give 
great importance to breadth of learning.”38 
Xunzi regarded the Six Classics as the core lesson of learning and it is necessary 
for the gentleman to be proficient in them.  
Its proper method is to start with the recitation of the Classics and conclude with 
the reading of the Rituals. Its real purpose is first to create a scholar and in the 
end to create a sage….The reverence and refinement of the Rituals, the concord 
and harmony of the Music, the breadth of the Odes and Documents, the subtlety 
of the Annals—all the creations of Heaven and Earth are completed in them.39 
Although Xunzi did not include yi (易) in the above quote, we can see in his text that 
he quoted many passages from yi to demonstrate his meanings. In this sense, we 
might say that Xunzi was also likely to regard yi as a source of learning. From the 
above analyses, we could see that Xunzi was very much a Confucian, in spite of the 
various disputes over his Confucian status. 
                                                        
37 Xunzi, vol. 3, 23.5a. 
38 Xunzi, vol. 3, 27.93. 
39 Xunzi, vol.1, 1.8. 
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Methodology of This Thesis 
This dissertation aims to demonstrate how Xunzi assimilated other non-Confucian 
schools’ teachings into Confucianism to solve the problems of Confucianism in the 
late Warring States period. Due to the length and scope of this thesis, I could not 
discuss all non-Confucian thinkers whose teachings could have influenced Xunzi’s 
philosophy, but limit the thesis only to the most relevant of these thinkers and their 
teachings. Even though I have not covered all possible influences, the examples of 
such influence I have chosen should be sufficient to elucidate how Xunzi went about 
improving Confucianism with non-Confucian teachings, without abandoning 
Confucianism altogether. 
How could we identify these non-Confucian schools as influencing Xunzi? The 
methodology applied in this dissertation is in-depth textual study of the Xunzi and 
textual comparison between the Xunzi and other Warring States texts. Throughout the 
comparison between Xunzi and other texts, we find many striking similarities among 
them. For example, Xunzi’s view of human xing as bad is rather similar to Shang 
Yang’s view of human xing as profit-loving.  
Of course, textual similarity alone could not establish conclusively that Xunzi 
was influenced by some non-Confucian texts like Shang Jun Shu. We could not even 
know exactly if the extant Shang Jun Shu or Zhuang Zi, which are used in our textual 
comparison, were available to Xunzi. Nevertheless, as current scholarship has 
established some facts about Xunzi’s biography and the time when these 
non-Confucian thinkers lived, we could at least say that Xunzi was quite possibly 
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influenced by the thoughts of these non-Confucian thinkers in his career. For example, 
since we know that Xunzi had visited the Qin state, which had carried out Shang 
Yang’s reforms, Xunzi would have seen many things related to Shang Yang’s reform 
and became familiar with Shang Yang’s philosophy. Thus, even if Xunzi had never 
seen the extant Shang Jun Shu, he at least knew something about Shang Yang’s 
philosophy during his stay in Qin. This supports the thesis that Xunzi’s view of 
human xing was influenced by Shang Yang, and any similarities between the Xunzi 
and the Shang Jun Shu point further in the same direction.  
We might never know whether Xunzi was really influenced by some particular 
non-Confucian thinkers unless he mentioned them explicitly in his text. The influence 
is however a reasonable supposition of the relationship between Xunzi’s text and 
other non-Confucians’ texts. What I shall do in this dissertation is to add some 
supporting evidence for establishing a relationship of influence without proving its 
truth. In this dissertation, what is more important is to identify the elements in the 
Xunzi, whatever their source, that resemble non-Confucian thought, and show how 
and to what extent they improve Confucianism in the context of the late Warring 
States period. We know that Confucianism have encountered serious problems and 
challenges, most of which were caused by its theories losing touch with reality. In this 
case, to find out why these non-Confucian teachings were flourishing and posed a 
great challenge to Confucianism in this period while Confucianism declined and lost 
touch with the time is significant for the study of Confucianism.  
Through the textual study of Confucian texts and non-Confucian texts, we could 
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elucidate how some thoughts of these non-Confucian texts could be very helpful in 
improving Confucianism in the late Warring States period. In this regard, Xunzi may 
be regarded as a precursor of later Confucians (Song and Ming Neo-Confucians, and 
Modern New Confucians) who adopted the same strategy and incorporated different 
non-Confucian teachings into Confucianism for the same reason. In this sense, one 




CONFUCIAN TEACHINGS ON ZHI (KNOWLEDGE/WISDOM)  
 
Epistemology in Confucianism is often neglected, in comparison with the lasting 
attention paid to Confucian ethics or political philosophy. Many believe that in 
Chinese philosophy generally, the concerns of knowledge “never became separate 
divisions of Chinese philosophy.”1 However, the lack of scholarly interest in the 
topic of zhi, usually translated as knowledge or wisdom, in Confucianism does not 
mean that it is trivial or insignificant.2 Although the topic of zhi is not the focus of 
discussion in early Confucianism, this study will nevertheless start with the analysis 
of zhi. This is because understanding zhi, even though quite different from Western 
epistemology in its focus and implications, is the first and most important step in 
achieving an understanding of the moral and political ideals in Confucianism, or even 
in Chinese philosophy. 
The term zhi, which appears in the Analects and other pre-Qin Confucian texts, 
besides being translated as “knowledge,” “knowing,” “to know,” “one who knows,” 
could also be translated as “wisdom” or “the wise.” Early Confucian discussions of 
zhi are usually in relation to learning, thinking and the practice of moral conduct, 
which are believed to be the most important ways of knowing (or wisdom). 
This chapter tries to make it clear that Xunzi’s teachings on zhi developed a kind 
                                                        
1 Frederick W. Mote, Intellectual Foundations of China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), p. 94. 
2 The topic of knowing became a focus of later Confucians, such as Wang Yangming, who argued for the 
integration of knowing and practicing (zhixing heyi). A recent book by Warren G. Frisina , The Unity of Knowledge 
and Action: Toward a Nonrepresentational Theory of Knowledge (New York: State University of New York, 2002), 
have extensive discussion on this topic.  
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of methodology for making Confucianism more adaptable to its time, ordered towards 
the realization of moral and political ideals. This contrasts with former Confucian 
teachings which emphasized the transmission of texts and preservation of ritual 
practices without much regard for historical change. In this case, Xunzi broadened the 
way of knowing, which involves both learning and thinking, and he assimilated the 
terms, xu, yi and jing from Zhuangzi to provide more guidance on how to think in 
order to adapt Confucian teachings to the times and achieve Confucian ideals.  
 
Learning (Xue 學)  
According to Confucius, 
Those who are born with knowledge (zhi 知) are the highest. Next come those 
who attain knowledge through study. Next again come those who turn to study 
after having been vexed by difficulties. The common people, in so far as they 
make no effort to study even after having been vexed by difficulties, are the 
lowest.3 
Confucius never did explicitly identify those born with knowledge in the Analects. A 
possible reason is that such talents are probably too rare to be worth talking about or 
building a philosophy on. What Confucius did emphasize, however, is the second way 
of becoming knowledgeable: attaining zhi through learning. To acquire knowledge, 
they must be willing to learn. 
Confucius admitted that he was not born with knowledge.4 Rather he acquired 
                                                        
3 The Analects, 16.9. 
4 Refer to The Analects, 7.20. 
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his intelligence through learning diligently. His view was that only the man who was 
eager to learn could be called a gentleman (junzi).  
The gentleman seeks neither a full belly nor a comfortable home. He is quick in 
action but cautious in speech. He goes to men possessed of the Way to be put 
right. Such a man can be described as eager to learn.5 
Confucius emphasized the important role of learning in attaining zhi. Confucius said, 
I once spent all day thinking without taking food and all night thinking without 
going to bed, but I found that I gained nothing from it. It would have been better 
for me to have spent the time in learning.6 
Therefore, thinking alone could not give us knowledge. One needs to learn. 
Mencius also emphasized the important role of learning. He wrote: 
Learn widely and go into what you have learned in detail so that in the end you 
can return to the essential.7 
Similarly for Mencius, there is an important connection between learning and an 
orderly state.  
When those above ignore the rites, those below ignore learning, and lawless 
people arise, then the end of the state is at hand.8 
However, there is some difference between Mencius and Confucius with regard 
to zhi. For Mencius, everyone is born with a “sprout” of zhi which needs to be 
developed into Confucian sagely wisdom. Mencius claimed further that all people are 
                                                        
5 The Analects, 1.14. 
6 The Analects, 15.31. 
7 D. C. Lau, trans., Mencius (London: The Penguin Group, Penguin Books, 1970), 4B15. 
8 Mencius, 4A1. 
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born with liangzhi. 
What a man is able to do without having to learn it is what he can truly do; what 
he knows without having to reflect on it is what he truly knows (liangzhi 良知).9 
So, for Mencius, it is important that zhi includes naturally endowed knowledge in 
everyone; but for Confucius, although a rare few may be born with knowledge, most 
of the time knowledge is acquired, and it is the acquisition of knowledge he 
considered most important. Confucius is concerned with knowledge derived from 
experience through the process of learning and thinking. However, for Mencius, we 
are born with some kind of knowledge as well as the potential for more knowledge. 
Although more narrowly concerned about morality instead of reality in general, the 
different views of zhi in the Analects and the Mencius find an analogy in the 
empiricist-rationalist debate in western philosophy. The empiricists, such as Locke 
and Hume argued that “the only way something can be known to be real is via 
experience.”10 As empiricists deny the possibility of innate knowledge, experience 
(including learning) becomes the only path to knowledge and wisdom. The 
rationalists, such as Descartes and Kant, argued that “an important part of what we 
can know to be real can be known to be real independently of experience.”11 At least 
some knowledge is innate, and such innate knowledge is what makes possible 
knowledge known by other means. Intuition, they argue, and not experience is the 
source of knowledge. One might say that Confucius is more of an empiricist with 
regard to zhi although he does not reject the rationalist position completely, while 
                                                        
9 Mencius, 7A15. 
10 Martijn Blaauw and Duncan Pritchard, Epistemology A-Z, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p.47.   
11 Ibid., p.123. 
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Mencius is more of a rationalist. Xunzi is closer to Confucius’ empiricist tendency 
and takes it even further.   
For Xunzi the acquisition of knowledge through learning is more crucial than it 
is in Confucius and Mencius. He had a whole chapter titled “Exhorting Learning.” 
Learning is an important stage in or a method of becoming wise. He wrote: 
I once spent a whole day in thought, but it was not so valuable as a moment in 
study. I once stood on my tiptoes to look out into the distance, but it was not so 
effective as climbing up to a high place for a broader vista. A man who borrows a 
horse and carriage does not improve his feet, but he can extend his travels 1,000 
li. A man who borrows a boat and paddles does not gain any new ability in water, 
but he can cut across rivers and seas. The gentleman by birth is not different 
from other men; he is just good at “borrowing” the use of external things.12 
Since our own innate abilities are rather limited, we should learn from others in order 
to attain our goal. This is more effective than depending solely on our own ability. 
Learning is so important that it should continue throughout one’s life and stop only 
with death.13 
Why did Xunzi emphasize learning? The reason may be that Xunzi did not seem 
to have believed that there are some people who could be born with knowledge. In 
fact, people are only born with the same capability for learning.14 Xunzi’s view 
departed from that of Mencius who believed that all people have the sprouts of 
knowledge and innate knowledge (liangzhi).  
                                                        
12 Xunzi, vol. 1, 1.3. 
13 Xunzi, vol.1, 1.8. 
14 Xunzi, vol.1, 1.3. 
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Although Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi all advocated learning, they held 
different views on the content of learning. According to the Analects, 
The Master instructs under four heads: culture (wen), moral conduct (xing), 
doing one’s best (zhong) and being trustworthy in what one says (xin).15 
Here, culture (wen), is believed to have included literature, rituals, music and customs. 
For Confucius, wen refers principally to the traditions of Zhou dynasty.  
The Zhou surveys the two preceding dynasties. How resplendent is the culture! 
My choice is with the Zhou.16 
From the point of view of Confucius, the traditions of Zhou are a model of an ideal 
society. Knowledge that should be learned and transmitted included a responsibility 
beyond the cognition of objects in the world. It was a process of becoming aware of 
the precious cultural legacy, preserving it and transmitting it. Confucius was not much 
concerned with the natural world; on the contrary, he concentrated much more on 
human cultures and traditions. To cherish the cultural traditions of Zhou, follow them 
and transmit them to later generations became Confucius’ focus. The core lesson of 
Zhou traditions lies in the li of Zhou dynasty,17 which could be traced back to the 
“Golden Age” of Western Zhou period. Confucius advocated Zhou li as the most 
important content for learning.  
Li, in its original form, is a kind of religious form guiding primitive men in their 
ritual sacrifices to spirits and deities. Magic, fairy tales, and various ritual 
performances constituted li. Such li were neither political nor moral; it was only a 
                                                        
15 The Analects, 7.25. 
16 The Analects, 3.14. 
17 Refer to The Analects, 2.23. 
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form of religious practice or belief. By the time of Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties, li 
has evolved into something that was of a political and moral nature. For example, 
during the Shang Dynasty, li was a tool securing political order and military victory. 
During Zhou, li further evolved into a ritual that exemplified the moral authority of 
the reigning political authority. 18  In Confucius, li is an important tool for 
self-cultivation as well as maintaining a good socio-political order. Confucius said, 
The ruler should employ the services of his subjects in accordance with li. A 
subject should serve his ruler by doing his best.19 
Here, li is like the rules defining different political roles of the ruler and subject in the 
context of court. For Confucius, not only the court, but also a state needs to be 
governed by li. Confucius said, 
If a man is able to govern a state by observing li and showing deference, what 
difficulties will he have in public life? If he is unable to govern a state by 
observing li and showing deference, what good are li to him?20 
Aside from the political arena, li is also applied in the context of family. Confucius 
said, 
When your parents are alive, comply with li in serving them; when they die, 
comply with li in burying them; comply with li in sacrificing to them.21 
Besides political and social functions, li also had important moral functions. 
Confucius said,  
                                                        
18 Wang Guowei 王國維, Yinzhou zhidu lun 殷周制度論, vol.1 (Hebei: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001), p. 302. 
19 The Analects, 3.19. 
20 The Analects, 4.13. 
21 The Analects, 2.5. 
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Guide them by virtue, keep them in line with the rites, and they will, besides 
having a sense of shame, reform themselves.22   
For Confucius, li could not only keep people in line politically, but also transform 
them to be moral. In Confucius’ time, society lapsed into chaos because “rituals 
perished and music was destroyed” (libeng yuehuai 禮崩樂壞). As Confucius would 
argue, a good social order exists only when everyone acts virtuously to fulfill the 
responsibilities of their social roles or positions. Doing this presupposes familiarity 
with the norms of li, the compliance of which cultivates virtue in persons. This is the 
reason why Confucius recommended the learning of li.23 
Of course one does not merely learn li even though it is one of the most 
important things one should learn. Other things worth learning include literature, 
which Confucius speaks of in the Analects: 
Unless you study the Odes you will be ill-equipped to speak.24 
The Odes is the oldest collection of Chinese poetry, which could be traced back to the 
Western Zhou dynasty. It includes more than three hundred songs, odes and hymns 
representative of the ancient Chinese literatures. Confucius regarded the Odes as 
necessary learning for enhancing one’s speaking ability.  
Besides the repository of traditional culture, there is also the “physical” training 
curriculum. 
From the “six arts” established by Confucius as the curriculum for his 
followers—ritual, music, archery, charioteering, writing and calculations—it is 
                                                        
22 The Analects, 2.3. 
23 In a dialogue with his son—Kong Li, Confucius showed his concern about learning li. See The Analects, 16.13. 
24 The Analects, 16.13. 
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clear that learning was a project requiring a commitment on the part of the entire 
person, and that written documents were only one, albeit important, element in 
the scholar’s career.25 
Such physical training and practicing what one learnt is what he called “conduct” 
(xing 行). The other two elements of learning are zhong and xin, pertaining to moral 
relationships among people. Confucius tried to persuade the people to serve the lord 
loyally and be trustworthy friends.  
Thus, Confucius prescribed a curriculum that would lead to an orderly society 
and virtuous people. However, in Mencius this becomes unbalanced and incomplete. 
Xiang (庠), xu (序), xue (學) and xiao (校) were set up for the purpose of 
education. … They all serve to make the people understand human relationships. 
When it is clear that those in authority understand human relationships, the 
people will be affectionate.26    
So, his school was established to teach the understanding of “human relationships.”  
This gave the sage King further cause for concern, and so he appointed Qi as the 
Minister of Education whose duty was to teach the people human relationships: 
love (qin 親) between father and son, duty (yi 義) between ruler and subject, 
distinction (bie 別) between husband and wife, precedence (xu 序) of the old 
over the young, and faith (xin 信) between friends.27 
For Mencius, one needs to grasp such moral relationships in different circumstances 
                                                        
25 David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking Through Confucius (New York: State University of New York Press, 
1987), p. 45. 
26 Mencius, 3A3. 
27 Mencius, 3A4. 
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rather than li which was emphasized by Confucius as the core of learning. This lead to 
a weakening of Confucianism and opened it up to various objections. The time 
Mencius lived in was the mid-late Warring States period, a period of political chaos 
and military struggles. Securing good socio-political order was urgent then. So li 
worked as a socio-political tool, and played a far more important role than it did in 
Confucius’ time. Mencius’ diminishing of li in learning made the realization of 
Confucian political ideal even more difficult. 
Mencius only believed that, once the people cultivated themselves to be moral 
through learning moral relationships and extended such benevolence to other people, 
the society would become orderly and people would live happily.28 In fact, reliance 
on the understanding of moral relationships seems too idealistic a program for 
securing an orderly socio-political order and an ideal society. Even if the people could 
be cultivated morally, there was no guarantee that an orderly society would emerge. 
An orderly society needs more, viz., coordination and organization. This is where li 
enters the picture. 
Like Confucius, Xunzi also regarded the classical texts as an important source of 
knowledge.  
Learning—where should it begin and where should it end! I say: Its proper 
method is to start with the recitation of the Classics and conclude with the 
reading of the Rituals. Its real purpose is first to create a scholar and in the end to 
create a sage.29 
                                                        
28 Refer to Mencius, 1A7. 
29 Xunzi, vol.1, 1.8. 
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Although we could not be absolutely certain what the Classics (jing) at that time were, 
they are suppoed to include the Documents, the Odes, the Music and the Spring and 
Autumn Annals in Xunzi’s time. Despite having different contents (the Classics 
pertains to the history, literature, music and politics in ancient times while the Rituals 
refers to the ritual performance and rules), they all lead to the Way of the sage kings. 
The Way of the Hundred Kings is at one with the sage. Hence, the Way 
expressed in the Odes, Documents, Rituals, and Music returns to this oneness. 
The Odes express the sage’s intentions; the Documents his official business; the 
Rituals his conduct; the Music his harmoniousness, (and the Annals his esoteric 
meaning).30 
So, the Classics are necessary for learning to be a Confucian scholar and even a sage. 
The emphasis on Rituals places Xunzi closer to Confucius.  
Besides the classical texts, the instructions from teachers, stemming from their 
practice and experiential grasp of reality, are also an important source of learning. 
Xunzi said,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
The Rituals and Music present models but do not offer explanation; the Odes and 
Documents present matters of antiquity but are not always apposite; the Annals 
are laconic, and their import is not quickly grasped. It is just on these occasions 
that the man of learning repeats the explanations of the gentleman. Thus, he is 
honored for his comprehensive and catholic acquaintance with the affairs of the 
world. Therefore it is said: “In learning, no method is of more advantage than to 
                                                        
30 Xunzi, vol. 2, 8.7. 
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be near a man of learning.”31 
Xunzi argued that these classics were unclear so they need the gentleman’s insights 
and commentary. Such a person knows better what these classics indicated. He can 
apply these classics according to circumstances and contexts. Hence one needs to 
learn from the gentleman besides reading the classics. He is a moral exemplar who is 
more familiar with worldly application. One can be considered knowledgeable only 
with the grasp of the classics and its application. So what might the applied 
knowledge be? In Jie Bi, Xunzi said, 
Thus, true learning inherently has a terminus to study. Where is its terminus? I 
say that it is at complete sufficiency. Who has such sufficiency? I say it is the 
sage king. Sageliness consists in a comprehensive grasp of the natural 
relationships between men. True kingship consists in a comprehensive grasp of 
the regulations for government. A comprehensive grasp of both is sufficient to 
become the ridgepole for the world. Hence, the student should take the sage king 
as his teacher and the regulations of the sage king as the model.32  
It is from the sage king that we learn “sageliness” and “true kingship.” “Sageliness” 
includes the moral relationships among the people; and “true kingship” includes the 
regulations for a government. Such regulations include the guidance that li offers for 
politics. Thus, Xunzi thought moral learning and political learning equally important. 
However, it was not always true for Xunzi that they went hand in hand. Indeed, moral 
learning does not automatically lead to a good government and good social order. In 
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this case, Xunzi argued for the combination of moral learning and political learning.  
What makes a person a lord? I reply: To employ li in dividing the largess and to 
be equitable in every case and unbiased. What makes a person a minister? I reply: 
To wait on the lord according to li and to be loyal, obedient, and not lazy. What 
makes a person a father? I reply: To be generous, kind and to possess li.33 
Compared with Mencius, Xunzi argued that the content for learning should not only 
include the moral relationships among people, but also the political and social 
regulations guided by li. It is Xunzi who revived Confucius’ teachings in his time. For 
Confucius, wen, xing, zhong and xin, that is, political and moral learning should be 
combined together to produce some kind of teaching adaptable to the times and 
leading to the realization of Confucian ideals. Xunzi followed Confucius’ teachings in 
this aspect and incorporated li (political learning) with zhong and xin (moral learning) 
in every circumstance of a person’s conduct (xing). By emphasizing the importance of 
political learning, Xunzi saved Confucianism from lapsing into a situation in which 
the realization of Confucian political ideal is almost impossible, which has been the 
case with Mencius’ teachings. Thus, we could say that Xunzi’s teaching of learning is 
a correction of Mencian bias and returns to Confucius. 
In Xunzi’s view, aside from li, fa should also be included in the content for 
learning. In the Xunzi, fa often means “the law”, especially when it appears in the 
term lifa 禮法.  
When everything within and without the court is like this, nothing is left 
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unbalanced and unadjusted, and nothing is without order and management. All 
these matters have been the same for all the Hundred Kings, and are the primary 
social divisions of ritual (li) and the law (fa).34 
Xunzi used fa with li to maintain the normative social distinctions and political 
order.35 Xunzi said, 
Lord and minister, superior and inferior, noble and base, old and young, down to 
commoners—all should exalt this as the standard of rectitude. Only in this way 
will all examine themselves to ensure that they devote their attention to the tasks 
of their social class. In this all the Hundred Kings have been identical, and this 
principle forms the pivot and axis of all ritual principles (li) and the law (fa).36  
Thus, Xunzi believed that “one who is in the process of learning is one who learns of 
ritual principles (li) and the law (fa).”37 Such a broad learning in Xunzi reminds us 
the similar emphasis on broad learning in Confucius. For both of them, only if 
learning is not narrow in scope, could people have an open mind and only then would 
they be ready to learn “extraordinary” things that could be more adaptable to their 
times and so more effectively achieve and realize Confucian ideals.  
Although all people should learn li and fa for Xunzi, not all could understand the 
meanings of li and fa.  
Although the common men follow li, they do not understand (zhi) it; while the 
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sage not only follows li, but also understands it.38 
Nevertheless, even if people do not understand the meanings of li and fa, they could 
still learn and follow them and at least behave well. Xunzi said, 
When knowledgeable (zhi), he understands the interconnections between 
phenomena and can assign them to their proper logical category. When ignorant, 
he is honest and diligent and can follow fa.39 
Through being instructed by the teachers and moral authorities would they behave 
according to li and fa, the result of which is an orderly society. This is true even if 
they do not understand the meanings of li and fa. In this way, the authoritative force of 
the teacher and moral exemplar is greater in Xunzi’s teachings. 
In fact, in Xunzi’s view, the teacher and moral exemplar are authorities, whose 
teachings should be exalted to the highest and followed step by step.  
Having a teacher and the model is man’s greatest treasure, and lacking a teacher 
and the model his greatest calamity.40 
For Xunzi, it is the teacher and moral exemplar who can apply the texts in realistic 
contexts. For this reason, Xunzi exalted the teacher’s authority. As Herrlee G. Creel 
commented, “it is Hsun Tzu [Xunzi] who exalted him [the teacher] to the skies.”41  
In contrast, Confucius did not exalt the teacher to such a high position. He said, 
Even when walking in the company of two other men, I am bound to be able to 
learn from them. The good points of the one I copy; the bad points of the other I 
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correct in myself.42 
This passage appears to conflict with the suggestion that the teacher is infallible and 
beyond reproach. Because any one could become a teacher, there was no way to 
validate the teacher’s claims, and if there was to be any form of validation, the 
students had to do it. For this reason Confucius insisted that the student had to apply 
discerning discrimination when he hears the teacher, who is merely a support and not 
the source of truth. The teacher’s authority in Confucius is played down.  
Mencius also emphasized the importance of the teacher in encouraging the 
students to acquire moral knowledge. Equally, Mencius highlighted the need for 
students to be self-motivated and it is the students rather than the teachers who are the 
primary cause of learning, as we can see in 7A3 and other chapters. Mencius argued 
that the teacher should instruct the students to seek the knowledge themselves.43 
Thus, both Confucius and Mencius emphasized the students’ active role in the 
process of learning. Confucius believed some people are born with knowledge. 
Mencius thought people are naturally good, so the students could become moral by 
learning independently. However, such ideas may be contradicted by 
counter-examples. In reality, independent learning might not be possible or common. 
In fact, even if the teacher helps the student learn, the student might not enjoy 
learning, nor apply what they learn. Both Confucius and Mencius could not 
effectively persuade people to acquire moral knowledge and become moral. In this 
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case, Xunzi strengthened the authority of teachers and moral exemplars and made 
them more awe inspiring and compelling so people could follow their example, obey 
concrete li and fa and become moral in the end. As Tu Wei-ming observes, 
The Confucian project, as shaped by Hsun Tzu [Xunzi], defines learning as 
socialization. Authorities such as ancient sages and worthies, the classical 
tradition, conventional norms, teachers, governmental rules and regulations, and 
political officers are all important resources for transforming human nature. A 
cultured person is by definition a fully socialized participant of the human 
community who has successfully sublimated his or her instinctual demands to 
further the public good.44 
In Xunzi’s view, people might not like to learn and follow these prescriptive political 
regulations. However, the awe inspiring and compelling teacher could effectively urge 
the people to follow his instructions. By emulating him, they may be willing to learn. 
It is possible that later in time, they might grasp the benefits that such political 
regulations brought about, and then they would become more willing to learn and 
follow them. So, society becomes orderly in the end. Thus, Xunzi provided a realistic 
solution on top of education to solve Confucius’ and Mencius’ problem. 
Although Xunzi argued that people should try to learn and understand li and fa, 
he did not regard li and fa as something produced by the common people. A common 
person may only need to learn, understand and follow li and fa whereas the task of 
producing li and fa should be taken up by the sage. So, how could the sage produce li 
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and fa? For Xunzi, it requires the sage to have an extraordinary si.  
 
Si (思) 
Si is usually translated as “thinking.” However, in English, thinking is often 
contrasted with feelings or emotions, which makes this translation to “thinking” 
problematic because si also often means “pay attention to,” “be concerned about,” 
“desire to,” or “be thinking of in the sense of missing or yearning for someone or 
something.”  
Confucius emphasized the integration of learning and si and regarded the two 
parts as indispensable conditions of becoming knowledgeable. 
If one learns from others but does not think (si), one will be bewildered. If, on 
the other hand, one thinks but does not learn from others, one will be in peril.45 
Here, si seems to refer to the consideration of ideas we have learnt from another. In 
this case, si might be translated as “thinking.” For Confucius, if people learn but do 
not think, they will be lost in book learning or merely be imitating others. On the 
other hand, if people merely think but do not learn, there is a worse outcome: such 
ungrounded and empty thinking either diverts one’s attention from real problems or 
produces impractical solutions which could be dangerous. Thus, in Confucius’ view, 
learning and thinking should be combined. Neglecting either one would result in 
ignorance.  
Si is related to learning not only in terms of thinking over what is learned. Ames 
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goes further to regard si for Confucius is an important way of adapting what is learned 
to one’s own circumstances. He argues, 
One must be creative to take full advantage of appropriated culture, both in 
adapting it for his own place and time, and in using it as a structure through 
which to realize his own possibilities. He must labor assiduously to acquire the 
culture transmitted from ancient times but must also be able to take it a step 
further in maximizing the possibilities of the prevailing conditions...46 
In this case, si is the adaptation of one’s learning according to the present situation. In 
the view of Confucius, the li curriculum, which had included many religious rituals, 
should include more political and moral considerations during the Spring and Autumn 
period. Li should not only be regarded as a religious performance, but also a kind of 
political tool for securing a good socio-political order and moral tool for achieving the 
status of a gentleman. Thus, through the effort of si, one’s learning of li is expanded to 
the political and moral area, which would lead to political stability and moral 
cultivation of the citizenry. Confucius said, 
There are nine things the gentleman turns his thought to (jiusi 九思): to seeing 
clearly when he uses his eyes, to hearing acutely when he uses his ears, to 
looking cordial when it comes to his countenance, to appearing respectful when 
it comes to his demeanour, to being conscientious when he speaks, to being 
reverent when he performs his duties, to seeking advice when he is in doubt, to 
the consequences when he is enraged, and to what is right at the sight of gain.47 
                                                        
46 Hall and Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, p. 48. 
47 The Analects, 16.10. 
 42 
Here, si might be interpreted as “desiring to do something,” “attending to,” or 
“focusing on.” In this passage, Confucius shows us the “best practices” that one 
should employ in different political and moral circumstances. Through the process of 
si, a person could adapt li and other moral ideas to realistic scenarios and the result is 
an orderly society as well as one’s becoming a gentleman. 
Among the diverse usages of si, we could see that Confucius hoped people could 
incorporate si with learning so as to achieve a full understanding of what they have 
learned, adapt what is learned to the current situation, and desire to be moral when 
they are situated in different circumstances. 
In the Mencius, si also means “thinking.” For Mencius, si is the function of the 
heart/mind.  
The organ of the heart/mind (xin) can si. But it will find the answer only if it 
does si; otherwise, it will not find the answer.48 
Since Mencius claimed that human beings are born with moral sprouts that would 
perish without elaboration and development, si plays an important role in elaborating 
and developing the moral sprouts into their fully-grown status. Mencius argued, 
Ren, yi, li, and zhi are not welded on to me from the outside; they are in me 
originally. In fact, it is just that we do not think of (si) them. That is why it is said, 
“Seek and you will find it; let go and you will lose it.”49 
For Mencius, there is the capacity for si and there are sprouts of morality in all 
persons. Therefore is it within everyone’s power to discover the principles that would 
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guide them morally. It is through si that one grows the sprouts of morality, which 
results in the ordering of society. However, even cirang zhixin’ s moral development 
is not sufficient for bringing about an orderly society. For Mencius, even if cirang 
zhixin is mature and manifests li, it is not yet the normative socio-political order a 
chaotic society urgently needs. Mencius only emphasized the moral aspect of 
Confucius’ teachings. He considered si only in relation to moral thinking and not 
political deliberation. In this case, Mencius’ teaching of si could not supply a coherent 
and practicable system for guiding the achievement of the Confucian political ideal, 
which is a good and orderly society.  
Mencius’ moral psychology is too naive for achieving anything substantial. His 
theory could not survive the objection that people would not voluntarily develop their 
moralities, especially when their lives were at stake.50 Even if that objection were 
overcome, it does not mean that an orderly human society and a good government 
could be established. An orderly society needs more regulative institutions and 
systems to defend people’s benefits and curb crimes, all of which could not be 
brought about by moral development alone.  
In the context of Xunzi, si has multiple meanings, including “pondering” and 
“missing or longing for.” Xunzi elaborated on Confucius’ argument that learning and 
thinking should complement each other.  
The gentleman, knowing well that learning that is incomplete and impure does 
not deserve to be called fine, recites and enumerates his studies that he will be 
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familiar with them, thinks over (si) them and searches into them that he will fully 
penetrate their meaning……51  
In such contexts, si could be understood as pondering over and understanding fully 
what we have learnt. In Xunzi’s view, we should think and comprehend fully the 
implications of li. 
Now, man assuredly does not possess li and precepts of morality as part of his 
inborn nature; therefore he must study very hard when seeking them. Inborn 
nature is unaware of them; therefore in his thoughts and ideas he has to think and 
understand li and precepts of morality.52 
Aside from li, Xunzi argued for pondering over fa, the law, and fully understanding its 
meanings. Xunzi said, 
One who, not understanding the meanings of the laws (fa), attempts to rectify the 
norms contained therein, however broad his view, is bound to produce anarchy in 
what he superintends.53  
In the Xunzi, si is also used to indicate a kind of emotion that is missing or 
longing for someone.54 Besides these, there is another more important implication of 
si as it is applied in the Xunzi. Xunzi said, 
Those who keep to the mean provided by li (ritual) and are able to ponder (si) 
and meditate on it are said to be able to lü.55 
Here, it seems that Xunzi related si to deliberation (lü), which is a further 
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development of si. For Xunzi, deliberation means not only understanding fully the 
meaning of li, but also considering the possible consequences of one’s actions. 
When a man sees something desirable, he must lü (reflect on) the fact that with 
time it could come to involve what is detestable. When he sees something that is 
beneficial, he should reflect that sooner or later it, too, could come to involve 
harm. Only after weighing the total of the one against that of the other and 
maturely calculating should he determine the relative merits of choosing or 
refusing his desires and aversions.56 
Thus, si or lü had an important implication. That is, we should weigh (quan) the 
possible consequences and factors before taking action. This means that the action 
taken by a person does not merely influence what is present, but also the future.57 
Further, what comes under consideration includes long-term consequences. As A. S. 
Cua points out, 
Deliberation, at its inception, addresses a current perplexity. Its primary concern 
is the immediate consequence of pursuing concurrent desires. But the present 
situation, as one posing a problem of choice, may well be an exigent situation, 
i.e., a novel circumstance in which past experience does not provide sufficient 
guidance. Also, it may be one in which the decision to be rendered is a plan of 
action. In this case, the agent cannot be content with mere examination of the 
immediate consequences of the contemplated actions but must attend to distant 
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consequences—in Xunzi’s words, “consider the long view of things and think of 
their consequences,” (changlü guhou).58 
In Xunzi’s view, a person should consider the current reality and long-term 
consequences before he carries out a strategy. That is to say, when a ruler considers 
the need of the late Warring States period and the distant consequences of carrying out 
li, he could adapt li to be an important tool for maintaining a good socio-political 
order and realizing the Confucian political ideal.  
For Xunzi, only the sage could accumulate his si and learning to produce li and 
fa. Through his learning, the sage would have within himself the basic stuff from 
which he grasps li. When he employs his si, he could fully understand its meanings 
and adapt it to the current circumstances. Xunzi said, 
The sage accumulates his thoughts (si) and ideas. He masters through practice 
the skills of his acquired nature and the principles involved therein in order to 
produce ritual principles (li) and moral duty and to develop laws (fa) and 
standards.59 
In Xunzi’s view, when a sage lives in a time of chaos, he should employ his 
realistic si and change li to be more political and prescriptive and establish fa to 
maintain a good socio-political order. Mencius’ model of achieving good 
socio-political order through moral cultivation is inappropriately idealistic for the time 
of late Warring States period. What the time needs is an effective political system to 
maintain a good socio-political order. Thus, li in association with fa become urgently 
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needed in achieving such political purpose. For Xunzi, when a sage’s learning and si 
were combined together and increasingly accumulated, li and fa, which could be more 
adaptable to the time of late Warring States period, could be crystallized.  
Although Xunzi stressed the political importance of li, he did not neglect li’s 
moral function. In fact, for Xunzi, the political li could also produce moral qualities. 
Xunzi said, 
It is through ritual (li) that the individual is rectified…When what ritual 
mandates, you make so in your conduct, then your emotions will find peace in 
ritual…When your emotions find peace in ritual and your knowing is like that of 
your teacher, then you will become a sage.60 
In this sense, to learn the knowledge of li and act according to the standards of li will 
help a person to realize the moral goal of ren. Thus, through his teachings of si, Xunzi 
believed he had found an effective tool of achieving a good socio-political order and 
moral person, which are the fundamental ground of Confucian political and moral 
ideals.  
Nevertheless, even if Xunzi stressed the importance of si, which ponders what 
one has learnt and applies these in the moral and political reality in the time of the late 
Warring States period, it did not mean that he really thought everyone could attain 
such a complete understanding or bridge the gap between theory and reality. In fact, 
Xunzi recognized the different levels of moral and political awareness. For Xunzi, 
only those who could not only adhere to li but also think and have a fondness for li 
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could be called a sage. However, for a common person, even if he could adhere to li 
steadfastly, he might not be able to fully understand it, not to mention love it.61 Thus, 
si brings the moral development to a higher stage that not everyone will achieve, or at 
least not at the same pace. We must start from the bottom. It is in this sense that Xunzi 
argued for learning from the teachers and moral exemplars. 
Even if Xunzi regarded the sage as the only one who could understand the true 
meaning of li and consider the applicability of what is learnt in current time, while the 
common people might not be able to produce li and fa by themselves, the role of si, 
needless to say, is very important in acquiring moral knowledge and providing new 
models (li and fa) for political education. So, how could one improve one’s si? To 
answer this question, Xunzi needed to give a more detailed account of the functioning 
of si, and he did that by borrowing from the Daoists’ more developed philosophical 
psychology, probably because he found the Mencian account inadequate.  
 
Xu (Emptiness), Yi (Unity) and Jing (Stillness) in the Heart/Mind (Xin 心)  
How could a person perform si? This is the function of the xin (心), which could be 
translated as “heart,” “mind,” or “heart/mind.” Confucius, unfortunately, had little to 
say about xin and later Confucians could not depend on him for an adequate 
philosophical psychology. In the view of Mencius, the moral sprouts—germ of ren, yi, 
li, and zhi—belong to xin. Mencius said, 
The xin of compassion is the germ of ren; the xin of shame, of yi; the xin of 
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courtesy and modesty, of observance of li; the xin of right and wrong, of zhi. 
Man has these four sprouts just as he has four limbs.62 
In 6A15, Mencius also said that the function of xin is to si. As we have discussed in 
the section of si, Mencian si facilitates the development of moral sprouts in the xin. 
However such innate elaboration or development is not a very plausible account, and 
moreover pays no attention to the need to adapt Confucian ideals to the times. For 
Xunzi, however, si should adapt what is learnt to the current circumstance. To achieve 
such si, Xunzi argued that xin should be kept in a status of xu (emptiness), yi (unity) 
and jing (stillness). Only if such status could be attained, could xin establish a kind of 
si that could adapt what is learnt to the current circumstance and realize the Confucian 
way. Xunzi said,  
What do men use to know the Way? I say that it is in the xin. How does the xin 
know? I say by its emptiness, unity, and stillness. The xin never stops storing; 
nonetheless it possesses what is called emptiness. The xin never lacks duality; 
nonetheless it possesses what is called unity. The xin never stops moving; 
nonetheless it possesses what is called stillness.63 
Some scholars have noticed the notion of “emptiness, unity and stillness” in Xunzi 
was due to the influence of Zhuangzi.64 If we compare the Xunzi with the text of 
Zhuangzi, there are indeed many striking similarities that support the claim that Xunzi 
was probably influenced by Zhuangzi in employing “emptiness, unity, and stillness” 
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to enhance the means for knowing the Way. 
    Xunzi and Zhuangzi shared similar views about some problems of their 
respective times. In Xunzi’s and Zhuangzi’s times, various academic schools argued 
for their own views and against other schools’ views. Under such situation, Xunzi 
said, 
Each of these methods encompasses but a single corner of the Way. But the Way 
itself is constant in its form yet completely changeable. One corner is an 
insufficient basis for drawing conclusions about it. Men with knowledge of some 
small point gaze upon their single corner of the Way and are never able to 
recognize that it is only a small corner. Thus, they consider it sufficient and 
proceed to embroider upon it. Within they bring disorder upon themselves; 
without they cause others to be deluded…Such are the misfortunes of blindness 
and being closed to the truth.65 
So, Xunzi regarded the prejudices existing in various schools as the root reason for 
their radical debates. Interestingly enough, Zhuangzi also held such view: 
But the world is in great disorder, the worthies and sages lack clarity of vision, 
and the Way and its Virtue are no longer One. So the world too often seizes upon 
one of its aspects, examines it, and pronounces it good. But it is like the case of 
the ear, the eye, the nose, and the mouth; each has its own kind of understanding, 
but their functions are not interchangeable. In the same way, the various skills of 
the hundred schools all have their strong points, and at time each may be of use. 
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But none is wholly sufficient, none is universal.66 
For Zhuangzi, only if one’s knowledge becomes broad enough and not any longer 
narrow, could it be regarded as the “Great Knowledge (dazhi大知).” He said, 
Great Knowledge (dazhi 大知 ) is broad and unhurried; Little Knowledge 
(xiaozhi 小知) is cramped and busy.67 
Thus, for both Xunzi and Zhuangzi, the views of any individual school are too narrow 
to be regarded as the comprehensive understanding of the world. Both of them 
believed that these parochial views, although having their own strong points, are only 
prejudices and not sufficient for our understanding of the world. In this case, Xunzi 
was quite similar with Zhuangzi in reviewing the hundred schools, although Zhuangzi 
was also criticized by him, and as a Confucian he would also fall under Zhuangzi’s 
disapproval.68 
Since the views of any individual school are too narrow, how could we achieve a 
comprehensive understanding of the world? For Xunzi, this requires a person to 
accommodate the myriad things and views: 
The sage knows the flaws of the mind’s operation and perceives the misfortunes 
of blindness and being closed to the truth. This is why he is without desires and 
aversions, without beginnings and ends of things, without the remote or near, 
without broadness or shallowness, without antiquity or modernity. He lays out all 
the myriad things and causes himself to exactly match how each settles on the 
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suspended balance (jianchen wanwu er zhong xuanheng 兼陳萬物而中懸衡).69 
In the text of Zhuangzi, we also find a strikingly similar passage describing how to 
avoid prejudices and achieve a comprehensive understanding of the world. 
    Be broad and expansive like the endlessness of the four directions—they have 
nothing which bounds or hedges them. Embrace the ten thousand things 
universally (jianhuai wanwu 兼懷萬物)—how could there be one you should 
give special support to? This is called being without bent.70 
For Zhuangzi, it seems that we should not only lay out and accommodate the myriad 
things and views, but also treat them equally without preferences. Thus, for Xunzi and 
Zhuangzi, we should accommodate the myriad things and views instead of fixating on 
only one thing or view of the world. For Xunzi, a person should not be obsessed by 
the views of any one school or thinker, in which he could not see the whole picture; in 
fact, he should try his best to combine all useful aspects of various schools to 
formulate a holistic view of the truth. For Zhuangzi, we should not be obsessed by our 
previous knowledge or prejudice but should treat all knowledge or even opposite 
views as equally important for knowing the whole truth. In Zhuangzi’s words, this is 
the process of “by means of clarity (yiming以明).” In discussing the dispute between 
Confucians and the Mohists, Zhuangzi said, 
When the Way relies on little accomplishments and words rely on vain show, 
then we have the rights and wrongs of the Confucians and the Mohists. What one 
calls right the other calls wrong; what one calls wrong the other calls right. But if 
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we want to right their wrongs and wrong their rights, then the best thing to use is 
clarity ( yiming 以明).71 
In Guo Xiang’s interpretation, the term “yiming” implies that we should illuminate 
our own views by accommodating and acknowledging other views. Hu Shih also 
argues that this term means that one side should consider the other side’s views to 
illuminate what he does not know; the other side should also consider this side’s view 
to illuminate what he does not know. Thus, there will be no such distinctions and 
disputes between different sides.72 Zhuangzi is trying to tell us that we should treat 
the different schools equally. In this respect, it is quite possible that Xunzi was 
influenced by Zhuangzi again in his concern about prejudice, or at least, they shared 
something in common in their views on this issue.  
Both Xunzi and Zhuangzi argued that we should accommodate the myriad things 
and various views to avoid prejudices, but how could a person accomplish this? Xunzi 
said, 
Men (Ren 人) from birth have awareness. Having awareness, there is memory. 
Memories are stored in the mind, yet the mind has the property called emptiness. 
Not allowing what has previously been stored to interfere with what is being 
received in the mind is called emptiness.73 
Although we have stored in our xin memories of the knowledge we have perceived, 
xin should not be totally preoccupied with such previous knowledge to the point of 
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neglecting the importance of future learning. Even if what we are going to learn is 
different from or contradicts what we have learnt, we should be able to entertain it 
without prejudice and understand it on its own terms. That is to say, regardless of how 
much knowledge we have stored in our xin, we should reserve enough room for 
accommodating new knowledge. Only in this way could the previous knowledge 
serve as the basis of our future learning. Also, only in this way would future learning 
add to our knowledge persistently. Thus, Xunzi employed the method of xu to attain 
the detached mind to accommodate various views in the xin. 
Quite similarly, for Zhuangzi, the usage of xu is also for accommodating the 
myriad things and various views in the world. A dialogue in the Zhuangzi stresses the 
importance of xu. 
[Confucius says,] “Make your will one! Don’t listen with the ears, listen with xin. 
No, don’t listen with xin, but listen with qi (vital energy). Listening stops with 
the ears, xin stops with recognition, but qi is empty and waits on all things. The 
Way (dao) gathers in emptiness alone. Emptiness is the fasting of xin.74 
In Zhuangzi’s view, what has been learnt in the xin might hinder true realization of the 
Way. In this case, Zhuangzi suggested that we discard all previous knowledge in the 
xin to achieve the status of emptiness so as to accommodate all things of the Way in 
the xin. For Zhuangzi, only a sage could attain such a state of emptiness to 
accommodate the myriad things in the world: 
His (The sage’s) single xin (mind) reposed, the ten thousand things 
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submit—which is to say that his xu (emptiness) and stillness reach throughout 
Heaven and earth and penetrate the ten thousand things.75 
Thus, both Xunzi and Zhuangzi used the method of xu to accommodate the myriad 
things and views in the world. Such usages of xu are quite similar as both aim at 
accommodating more views and understanding the world more comprehensively. 
Thus, Xunzi’s purpose was quite similar to that of Zhuangzi in that they shared the 
same concern of avoiding the interruption of previous knowledge or prejudice and of 
accommodating diverse views in the process of knowing. 
A difference, however, should be noticed. Xunzi’s “emptiness” is not total 
emptiness. In other words, the previous knowledge should still be stored in the xin so 
that the further acquired knowledge could be gained in addition to previous 
knowledge. Xunzi said, 
The xin never stops storing…76 
Nevertheless, for Zhuangzi, “emptiness” is total emptiness, which means, xin should 
be kept totally empty when it recognizes the things but will not store anything when 
the recognition stops. Zhuangzi said, 
Hold on to all that you have received from Heaven but do not think you have 
gotten anything. Be empty, that is all. The Perfect Man uses his mind like a 
mirror—going after nothing, welcoming nothing, responding but not storing.77 
So why are Xunzi and Zhuangzi similar yet different? The reason is that, while 
sharing some concerns about people’s narrow-minded prejudices, they used this term 
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for different purposes in the wider context. For Xunzi, the usage of xu is for 
cultivating xin into an ideal state so as to know the Way. 
What do men use to know the Way? I say that it is the mind. How does the mind 
know? I say by its xu (emptiness), unity, and stillness.78 
So, for Xunzi, the usage of xu is for dispelling prejudices in the xin and knowing the 
Confucian way comprehensively. This is a moral epistemological purpose within the 
context of personal cultivation and good government.  
For Zhuangzi, the usage of xu has a broader, more profound purpose. In the 
Zhuangzi, xu is often used to describe the “beginning” of the world. Zhuangzi said, 
In the Great Beginning, there was nonbeing…If the nature is trained, you may 
return to Virtue, and Virtue at its highest peak is identical with the Beginning. 
Being identical, you will be empty; being empty, you will be great.79 
For Zhuangzi, the beginning of the world is empty and the myriad things in the world 
are produced from this emptiness. In this case, people should train their nature to 
return to that beginning, that is, the absolute emptiness. Zhuangzi put forward a 
training method for attaining the state of xu: 
Confucius said, “...Emptiness is the fasting of the xin.” Yan Hui said, “Before I 
heard this, I was certain that I was Hui. But now that I have heard it, there is no 
more Hui. Can this be called emptiness?” “That’s all there is to it,” said 
Confucius.80 
Thus, “the fasting of xin” might even require that we forget ourselves in order to 
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know the Way. In Zhuangzi, there is another important term related to the teachings of 
“emptiness”. That is “sitting down and forgetting (zuowang 坐忘).”  
I smash up my limbs and body, drive out perception and intellect, cast off form, 
do away with understanding, and make myself identical with the Great 
Thoroughfare. This is what I mean by sitting down and forgetting everything.81 
“Sitting down and forgetting” attains the state of becoming identical with the Way. 
Thus, for Zhuangzi, the usage of xu and the method for attaining xu are for returning 
human beings to the Way understood as encompassing everything: this is 
metaphysical and goes beyond the human way(s) and moral epistemology.  
For Xunzi, to establish the Confucian way and adapt what is learnt to the current 
circumstance, a person must open his mind and broaden it to avoid prejudices and 
accommodate more views. But how could such diverse views adopted from various 
schools be kept coherent and formulated into a set of systematic knowledge? This 
requires yi (unity). 
The xin from birth has awareness. Having awareness, there is perception of 
difference. Perception of difference consists in awareness of two aspects of 
things at the same time. Awareness of two aspects of things all at the same time 
entails duality; nonetheless the xin has the quality called yi. Not allowing the one 
thing to interfere with the other is called yi.82 
Yi in the Xunzi refers to xin’s function of maintaining coherence in knowing. This 
means: although we may have perceptions of different aspects among various things 
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or in a thing simultaneously, xin could concentrate on one aspect while at the same 
time keeping all the other aspects coherent. The xin would not let the perception of 
other aspects interrupt the perception of the current aspect, while these different 
perceptions could be kept coherent by xin’s function of yi.  
Xunzi’s usage of yi also reminds us of the same concept in the Zhuangzi. “Yi” in 
the context of Zhuangzi has three main interpretations: (1) It means the unity among 
all things in the world; (2) It means the concentration of xin; (3) It means all things in 
the world are the same. Let us first consider the first interpretation. 
In Zhuangzi’s view, all things including humans themselves are unified. He said, 
Heaven and earth were born at the same time I was, and the ten thousand things 
are one (yi) with me. We have already become one, so how can I say anything?83 
For Zhuangzi, the destruction of one thing means the birth of other things. So, from a 
holistic view, nothing is destroyed or born—all things are unified into a cosmos.84 
Quite similarly, Xunzi also regarded the myriad things including humans 
themselves as being unified. Xunzi said, 
    Tian has its seasons; Di its resources; and Man his government. This, of course, 
is why it is said that they “can form a Triad.”85 
Here, “Triad” seems to be a group that is comprised of heaven, earth, and humans 
among which, the myriad things in the world are included. In this respect, Xunzi’s 
cosmology is similar to Zhuangzi’s in that all things are unified in the cosmos.  
It should be noticed that there is a difference between Xunzi’s and Zhuangzi’s 
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views of unification among the myriad things. For Xunzi, humans are the center of the 
“Triad” which comprised the myriad things. Although humans and other things are 
unified, humans play a dominant role in governing and utilizing other things to satisfy 
human needs.86 However, for Zhuangzi, humans and other things have no distinction 
and it is Dao that unifies them.  
For Xunzi, since humans should govern and utilize the myriad things in the 
world to serve themselves, they should first try to know the myriad things. People 
could have different views of the world and this is the reason why the different 
schools exist in the world. But since the myriad things are unified, the knowledge of 
them should also be unified instead of being separated. In this sense, the different 
schools’ views, which could be regarded as different aspects of the whole truth, 
should be combined and unified into a whole so as to realize the final truth. That is to 
say, the various views of different schools should be unified to formulate a holistic 
view of the world. Xunzi said, 
The myriad things constitute one aspect of the Way, and a single thing constitutes      
one aspect of the myriad things. The stupid who act on the basis of one aspect of 
one thing, considering that therein they know the Way, are ignorant.87 
For Xunzi, since all views should be unified, we should not only focus on one 
particular view but should keep the different views of all things unified and coherent. 
Only in this way, we might be able to know the world comprehensively. For Xunzi, 
emptying xin and accepting the different views is only the first step for knowing the 
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truth. The next step is to unify these different perceptions and fit them together so as 
to achieve a full and good understanding.  
Even if Xunzi might be influenced by Zhuangzi in respect of his use of yi, he 
departed from Zhuangzi on the final purpose in using this term. For Zhuangzi, yi is 
the unity of the world’s myriad things at the beginning. So, the task for humans is to 
return to such original unity.   
In the Great Beginning, there was nonbeing; there was no being, no name. Out of 
it arose yi; there was yi, but it had no form. Things got hold of it and came to life, 
and it was called Virtue.88 
However, for Xunzi, the usage of the term yi is very specific. Epistemologically, it 
helps us focus on something and unify different views together, and thus one acquires 
a comprehensive understanding of the external world. This is the difference between 
Xunzi and Zhuangzi in using this term. 
Yi in the Zhuangzi also means the concentration of xin. In the passage about 
xinzhai, Zhuangzi argued that one’s mind should be concentrated when he fasts his 
mind.89 In the chapter zhibeiyou (“Wisdom Wanders North”), Zhuangzi said, 
Straighten up your body, concentrate your vision, and the harmony of Heaven 
will come to you. Call in your knowledge, concentrate your thoughts, and the 
spirits will come to dwell with you.90 
For Zhuangzi, only if the mind and sense organs could concentrate could a person 
achieve a good understanding. Like Zhuangzi, Xunzi also emphasized the importance 
                                                        
88 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, chap. 12, p. 131. 
89 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, chap. 4, p. 57. 
90 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, chap. 22, p. 237. 
 61 
of concentration in the mind. He said, 
Though the earth worm has neither the advantage of claws and teeth nor the 
strength of muscles and bones, it can eat dust and dirt above ground and drink 
from the waters of the Yellow Springs below, because its mind is concentrated on 
a constant end.91 
For Xunzi, concentration means no distraction in the mind, which impedes knowing. 
Without the concentration of the mind, we could not consistently perform. For Xunzi, 
“yi” also means “not allowing the one thing to interfere with the other,” which not 
only requires us to unify all different perceptions, but also concentrates our mind on 
one thing when we know. Only if we could concentrate on something consistently, 
could we not be distracted.  
Yi in the Zhuangzi has another important interpretation, that is, all things in the 
world are the same. Zhuangzi said, 
If you look at them from the point of view of their differences, then there is liver 
and gall, Chu and Yue. But if you look at them from the point of view of their 
sameness, then the ten thousand things are all one (yi).92 
Thus, all different things in the world are regarded as identical at a level more 
significant than their apparent differences in the view of Zhuangzi.  
Departing from Zhuangzi, Xunzi held a different view on this issue. In Xunzi’s 
view, the myriad things in the world are different and could not be regarded as 
identical. Xunzi said, 
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The myriad things share the same world, but their embodied form is different.93 
    Just as there are Heaven and Earth, so too there exists the distinction between 
superior and inferior.94 
For Xunzi, the myriad things including humans have their different attributes: 
Fire and water possess vital breath but have no life. Plants and trees possess life, 
but lack awareness. Birds and beasts have awareness, but lack a sense of 
morality and justice. Humans possess vital breath, life, and awareness, and add to 
them a sense of morality and justice. It is for this reason that they are the noblest 
beings in the world.95 
It is in this respect that Xunzi departed from Zhuangzi’s Daoist course. For Xunzi, it 
is because humans have moral attributes that they are significantly distinct from other 
things like plants, beasts, etc. It is in this sense that Xunzi regarded the Confucian way 
as the only right teachings for directing human life. As for the teachings of other 
schools, Xunzi only regarded them as the supplemental resource that might be utilized 
more or less to complete the Confucian way. That is to say, although the various views 
of different schools could be combined and unified to formulate the final truth, the 
most important and dominant teachings are still Confucian. It is also in this respect 
that Xunzi kept his Confucian status and did not lapse into Daoism. 
After xu and yi, it seems that a person could have formulated the most 
comprehensive knowledge of the world. However, for Xunzi, there is another 
necessary condition for achieving this goal which is jing (stillness) in the xin. Without 
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jing, xu and yi could not be completed smoothly. Xunzi said, 
When the mind is asleep, it dreams. When it relaxes, it moves of its own accord. 
When it is employed in a task, it plans. Thus the mind never stops moving; 
nonetheless it possesses the quality called stillness. Not allowing dreams and 
fantasies to bring disorder to awareness is called stillness.96 
“Jing” in the Xunzi means that we should overcome all kinds of illusions or dreams in 
the xin so as to realize the Way. Since we all have illusions or imaginations in our 
everyday life, such as dreams, nonsense thoughts, illusions, etc., we should not let 
such illusions distract our thinking. For Zhuangzi, illusions should also be dispelled 
so as to realize the Way. Zhuangzi said, 
Wipe out the delusions of the will, undo the snares of the heart, rid yourself of 
the entanglements to virtue; open up the roadblocks in the Way. Eminence and 
wealth, recognition and authority, fame and profit—these six are the delusions of 
the will. Appearances and carriage, complexion and features, temperament and 
attitude—these six are the snares of the heart…When these four sixes no longer 
seethe within the breast, then you will achieve uprightness; being upright, you 
will be still; being still, you will be enlightened….97 
Although Zhuangzi did not object to the same thing that Xunzi did, in realizing the 
Way both argued that xin should be kept still to know the Way.  
For Xunzi, xin should be kept still just like the still water to reflect the Way 
without distortion. Xunzi said, 
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The human mind may be compared to a pan of water. If you place the pan 
upright and do not stir water up, the mud will sink to the bottom, and the water 
on top will be clear and pure enough to see your beard and eyebrows and to 
examine the lines on your face. But if a slight wind passes over its surface, the 
submerged mud will be stirred up from the bottom, and the clarity and purity of 
the water at the top will be disturbed so that it is impossible to obtain the correct 
impression of even the general outline of the face. Now, the mind is just the 
same.98 
There is a strikingly similar passage in the Zhuangzi: 
The sage is still not because he takes stillness to be good and therefore is still. 
The ten thousand things are insufficient to distract his mind—this is the reason 
he is still. Water that is still gives back a clear image of beard and eyebrows; 
reposing in the water level, it offers a measure to the great carpenter. And if 
water in stillness possesses such clarity, how much more must pure spirit. The 
sage’s mind in stillness is the mirror of Heaven and earth, the glass of the ten 
thousand things.99 
If someone wants to clearly recognize the things in the world without distortion, he 
must pacify his xin to resemble the undisturbed water surface which could reflect 
clearly the images of objects. For Zhuangzi, external things could stir up the emotions 
and desires in ourselves. So Zhuangzi argued for stillness in the xin so as to avoid the 
interruption of external things.  
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From the passages above, we could see that in Xunzi’s view, “stillness” is a state 
of xin that is free from interruptions of illusions, dreams, etc. Only if xin attains the 
state of “stillness”, can it perform its thinking functions properly and reflect the 
Confucian way without distortion. For Zhuangzi, similarly, “stillness” means that we 
could prevent the xin being interrupted by all kinds of illusions and temptations so as 
to reflect the Daoist way without distortion. They are similar in using the term 
“stillness” in that the purpose is to reflect the Way without distortion, whether it is the 
Confucian way or Daoist way. Thus, we might suppose that Xunzi was influenced by 
Zhuangzi in the respect of “stillness,” or at least they shared a common point that 
helped Xunzi to expand Confucian philosophical psychology. Of course, the purpose 
of Xunzi for achieving stillness in the xin is for realizing the Confucian way, while 
that of Zhuangzi is for the Daoist way. 
Some scholars have noticed the similarities between Xunzi’s and Zhuangzi’s use 
of the terms xu, yi and jing, and have suggested why Xunzi borrowed them from 
Zhuangzi. Lee H. Yearley, for example, insightfully argues that the purpose of Xunzi 
in using these terms is to achieve a detached xin, which is not obsessed by external 
objects and one’s own views. Thus, Xunzi adopted these three terms from Zhuangzi to 
“allow people to act in the world and yet to attain a fulfillment defined in large part by 
equanimity and detachment.” In Yearley’s view, “Hsun Tzu’s [Xunzi’s] attempt to 
synthesize the insights of Taoism and the previous Confucian traditions rests on his 
vision of how the mind allows a person to be both active and detached.”100 While 
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Yearley is quite right that Xunzi used these three terms to describe the processes by 
which one attains a detached mind in order to make a reasonable moral judgment 
according to different circumstances, Xunzi has a further purpose. In fact, Xunzi used 
these three terms to refer not only to the making of a reasonable moral judgment 
according to different circumstances, but also to the attainment of a kind of moral 
teaching and political teaching that are adaptable to the times.  
Aaron Stalnaker also explains why Xunzi used these terms in nourishing xin.  
Without “emptiness” no one could learn about different ways of existence, about 
more refined and constructive choices and modes of satisfaction. Without “unity” 
no one could understand complex phenomena, whether social or natural, nor 
could anyone deliberate effectively on practical matters with distant 
consequences, nor could one focus sufficiently on the Confucian way to succeed 
in remaking one’s innate impulses in a more suitable, sagely form. Without 
“tranquility” no one could get sufficiently beyond the tugs of desire and emotion 
to step back and approve disciplined plans of action, nor could anyone quiet the 
fears and hopes raised by our mind’s tendencies to dream and plan. Xunzi’s ideas 
about the mind are necessary to resolve the tension between his views of innate 
impulses and self-cultivation, which would otherwise be incoherent.101 
I agree with Stalnaker that Xunzi’s account of xin in terms of the qualities of xu, yi 
and jing was for the purpose of keeping his own philosophy coherent. In Xunzi’s view, 
desires and emotions could become unruly if no external instructions are imposed on 
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them. For Xunzi, humans do not have innate moral awareness that could cultivate 
their desires and emotions. At the same time, we should not subject humans to 
coercive laws and punishments to make them conform to the behavioral guidelines 
while leaving out the moral cultivation, as the legalists do. For Xunzi, humans should 
on the one hand depend on themselves to conduct moral cultivation, and on the other 
hand rely on the external instructions guided by li and fa to make such moral 
cultivation feasible. In this process, xin becomes significant since it could accept the 
political and moral education and become the dominant power in controlling and 
cultivating desires and emotions. It is in this respect that we need to empty xin so that 
it could have extensive exposure to the political and moral education and cultivate 
desires and emotions to be moral. Of course, xu, yi and jing refer to the higher level 
thinking that ordinary people might not attain. For the common people, they may have 
to accept the political and moral education and act according to them. 
A recent work by Janghee Lee also argues that the reason why Xunzi borrowed 
these concepts from Zhuangzi is for attaining the knowledge of dao. 
Xunzi’s fundamental concern seems to lie not in the complete transformation of 
ordinary xin into achieved xin, but in the articulation of the capacities of xin to 
allow people to attain the knowledge of dao…li is closely related to the notion of 
dao…Li furnishes dao with specific and “formal prescriptions for proper 
behavior.” Accordingly, li can be deemed one of the core elements that embody 
the spirit of dao.102 
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Lee is right to point out that the purpose of Xunzi in borrowing these concepts from 
Zhuangzi is for attaining and exercising the knowledge of dao, in which li is one of 
the core elements. I wish to push his point further: the Confucian way is a much 
broader concept that may include not only the Confucian doctrines such as li, ren, yi, 
etc., but also some useful doctrines from other schools, including fa, which could be 
utilized to develop Confucianism to be more comprehensive.  
Besides the views of the above two scholars, the reason why Xunzi adopted these 
concepts (xu, yi, jing) is not only for maintaining coherence in his philosophy and 
attaining the knowledge of dao, but more importantly to provide a way to find new 
knowledge that would address theoretical inadequacies in Confucian teachings that 
arose in part because of the direction in which Mencius had taken the tradition. 
Among these theoretical inadequacies which in Xunzi’s view weakened Confucianism 
was Mencius’ theory of human nature being good. The next chapter will examine how 
Xunzi provided Confucianism with an alternative theory of human nature that he 
believed to be more plausible and to provide a better basis for the Confucian theory of 
moral cultivation and good government. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 CONFUCIAN TEACHINGS OF HUMAN NATURE (XING)  
 
For Xunzi, to achieve the Confucian moral and political ideals, people need to learn 
both moral knowledge and political knowledge from authoritative teachers and moral 
exemplars. Here, we may wonder why Xunzi argued for learning from others instead 
of learning by oneself. Not only teachers and exemplars are needed, both li and fa are 
also important instruments in Xunzi’s view of moral education and self-cultivation. 
Xunzi differs from Mencius in this because of their very different views of human 
nature. This chapter will show how Xunzi incorporated non-Confucian teachings 
which were probably borrowed from other schools to improve on Confucian teachings 
on human nature. 
To begin the discussion of xing in Confucianism, I will first introduce the closely 
related concept of tian, which is an important philosophical concept in Confucianism. 
Examining what tian means in Confucianism and its relationship with xing would 
help us to make an in-depth study on Confucian teachings of moral cultivation. Next, 
the problem surrounding tian in Confucianism preceding Xunzi is discussed in detail. 
After that, Xunzi’s solutions to this problem are set out. Here, I hope to explain how 
Xunzi’s view of natural tian successfully solves the problem existing in the moral 
teachings of Confucius and Mencius by incorporating Zhuangzi’s view of natural tian. 
Influenced by the latter’s naturalistic view of tian, Xunzi formulated a different view 
of xing, which provided a solution to problems of xing in the teachings of Confucius 
and Mencius. Throughout the discussion of how Xunzi solved the problem of tian and 
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xing in former Confucianism, I will also examine the possible influence of 
non-Confucians on Xunzi and how Xunzi incorporated these non-Confucian teachings 
into his reconstruction of Confucianism. 
 
Confucian Moral Cultivation: The Role of Xing and Tian 
Moral cultivation is a central issue for Confucianism, whether in Confucius, Mencius 
or Xunzi. The purpose of Confucian teachings is to persuade people to cultivate 
themselves morally so as to become virtuous gentlemen. Thus, knowing what human 
xing is and how it could be transformed is central to the Confucian project of moral 
cultivation.  
In Confucianism, the earliest interpretation on the relationship between xing and 
moral cultivation might be traced to Confucius. Confucius said, 
Men are close to one another by nature (xing). They diverge as a result of 
repeated practice.1 
This passage indicates two points: 1) Human xing is almost the same, whether it is 
good or bad; 2) whether human xing is good or bad does not matter so much as the 
practice which determines how humans become after birth. It seems that Confucius 
emphasized practice rather than the nature we are born with. The people about whom 
Confucius made the above generalization might not include those people who are the 
most intelligent or stupid, since in his view those people “are not susceptible to 
change.”2 Nevertheless, it is only a very small minority who are the most intelligent 
                                                        
1 The Analects, 17.2. 
2 Refer to The Analects, 17.3. 
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or the most foolish. In general one should pay more heed to the ethical practice 
instead of totally relying on xing for moral goodness or blaming it for badness.  
Compared with Confucius’ ambiguous attitude to xing, Mencius claimed that 
xing, which is composed of the four moral sprouts (of ren, yi, li, zhi), is morally good. 
Nevertheless, Mencius argued that these four moral sprouts in the xing are only the 
beginning, which should be nurtured through moral cultivation so as to grow into a 
fully-grown moral tree.  
Moral cultivation is not only concerned with human xing, but also related to the 
issue of tian. If tian is moral, then humans should complete the moral mission tian 
decrees and conduct moral cultivation in everyday life. If tian is amoral, people 
should do more in moral cultivation since tian does not endow humans with moral 
qualities. In addition, tian and xing are also interrelated. According to Mencius, tian is 
moral and endows humans with a xing that is moral. Yet Confucius acknowledged 
that tian does not always protect the virtuous. Xunzi offered an alternative theory of 
tian and xing that to him makes more realistic sense of the chaotic world and offered 
more effective means to address the immoralities of his times.  
 
Challenges to Confucius’ and Mencius’ Moral Concept of Tian 
In Shang Dynasty, di or shangdi (帝/上帝) is regarded as the supreme deity who 
could dominate the fate and life of human beings, including the rulers.3 Men could 
not change the fate that di imposed them and should follow the decree of di step by 
                                                        
3 Refer to Zhang Guangzhi張光直, zhongguo qingtong shidai中國青銅時代 (Beijing: Sanlian chubanshe, 1999), 
pp. 371-372.  
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step. In this case, di is the absolute ruler of humans. In Zhou Dynasty, tian replaced di 
as an anthropomorphic deity (rengeshen 人格神)4 who could decide the political fate 
of the rulers, which is still similar to the understandings of di in Shang Dynasty. As 
Kwang-Chih Chang observes, 
It is interesting to note that this Shang conception of Shang Ti (shangdi) was not 
carried over by the Chou (Zhou) rulers. In the Chou world view, there was also a 
Shang Ti, similarly playing the role of a Supreme Being, but Shang Ti of 
Western Chou became identified with Heaven (tian) and separated from the 
world of ancestors.5 
We can also find some evidence for this view in the texts of this period—“Tian gave a 
great charge to king Wen, to exterminate the great dynasty of Yin…”6 
Tian is regarded as the source of the legitimacy of the rulers. But more 
importantly, tian in the period of Zhou had gradually become endowed with moral 
characteristics, which became an important issue to later thinkers and philosophers. In 
the view of Zhou people, “the decree of tian is not constant (tianming michang 天命
靡常),”7 which means, tian would not eternally support one ruler or group. In this 
sense, tian becomes more flexible in dealing with human matters. If the ruler is 
virtuous and benevolent to his people, tian would favor him and support him to be the 
ruler. However, if the ruler could not meet the moral requirements tian required, he 
                                                        
4 There are some disputations among scholars about whether tian is a personal deity. A number of scholars, like 
Hou Wailu, Ren Jiyu and Fung Yu-lan believed Zhou people viewed tian as a personal deity with a will while Xu 
Fuguan and Lao Siguang denied that tian has connotations of a personal deity. For details of the debate, see 
Kwong-loi Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 207-210. 
5 Kwang-Chih Chang, Early Chinese Civilization: Anthropological Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1976), p. 157. 
6 James Legge, trans. “The Book of Historical Documents,” in James Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 3, part 2 
(London: Trubner, 1861), p.385. 
7 Luo Jiangsheng雒江生, Shijing tonggu 詩經通詁 (Xian: Sanqin chubanshe, 1998), p. 681. 
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would be abandoned. Thus, tian has no preferential affections and it helps only the 
virtuous (huangtian wuqin, weide shifu 皇天無親，惟德是輔).8 As Fu Sinian said, 
the idea that deems virtue to be the most worshipful thing became increasingly 
influential in the period of Zhou.9 
In the view of Confucius, tian endowed him with virtues and therefore he is 
protected by tian. That is why Huan Tui, who was an official of Song intending to kill 
Confucius, could not hurt him.10 Nevertheless, Confucius was not always sure about 
the support of tian. When he was under siege in Kuang, he said, 
With King Wen dead, is not the cultural heritage (siwen) invested here in me? If 
tian intends this culture to be destroyed, those who come after me will not be 
able to have any part of it. If tian does not intend this culture to be destroyed, 
then what can the men of Kuang do to me?11  
Siwen for Confucius includes literature, rituals, music, customs, moralities, etc. and 
mainly refers to the cultural traditions of Zhou Dynasty.12 Here, Confucius did not 
actually say that tian did not intend siwen to be destroyed. If it were to be destroyed, 
Confucius and the Zhou culture he possessed would also perish. 
In other places, Confucius increasingly cast doubt on whether tian always favors 
the virtuous person. When his favorite disciple, Yan Hui, died, he lamented, “Tian has 
bereft me! Tian has bereft me!”13 Here, Confucius is not only lamenting the death of 
                                                        
8 James Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 3, p. 490. 
9 Fu Sinian傅斯年, Fu Mengzhen xiansheng ji 傅孟真先生集, vol. 3 (Taipei: Taiwan University, 1952), pp. 
110-191. 
10 The Analects, 7.23. 
11 The Analects, 9.5. 
12 Refer to The Analects, 3.14. 
13 The Analects, 11.9. 
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Yan Hui, but also bemoaning why the moral undertakings of Yan Hui and himself 
were not favored by tian and successful in their times. We may say that the 
misfortunes humans encountered could be attributed to tian. However, Confucius 
maintained that we should not complain against tian just because tian does not always 
favor the virtuous persons: “I do not complain against tian, nor do I blame Man.”14 
 Since tian itself has many possibilities, supportive and counter forces coexist and 
occur by chance. Hence we need not complain why tian sometimes fails to favor or 
even destroys the virtuous person. Tian itself includes possibilities that are not within 
human control. In Confucius’ view, only if we could understand and face up to such 
contingent misfortunes, could we stop complaining against tian and do what we 
should do in the world. Thus, for a Confucian, he should know a gentleman cannot 
always avoid misfortunes, but would always persist in moral principles regardless of 
misfortunes. Confucius is one who “keeps working towards a goal the realization of 
which he knows to be hopeless (zhiqi buke er weizhi知其不可而為之).”15 However, 
it is too difficult for the common people to live up to such high ideals. If tian did not 
favor the virtuous persons and their moral undertakings, it is difficult to persuade 
people to conduct moral cultivation when they know the outcome of moral cultivation 
is often so miserable.  
Confucius’ problem is also confronted by Mencius. Mencius regarded tian as the 
moral heaven which could define the moral mission of human beings. Mencius said, 
There are honors bestowed by tian (tianjue 天爵 ), and there are honors 
                                                        
14 The Analects, 14.35. 
15 The Analects, 14.38. 
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bestowed by man (renjue 人爵). Benevolence, dutifulness, conscientiousness, 
truthfulness to one’s word, unflagging delight in what is good, —these are 
honors bestowed by tian.16 
Like Confucius, Mencius regards tian as the moral authority that not only endows 
humans with virtues but also provides the moral mission humans should fulfill in their 
lives. However, as for the issue of whether the virtuous always fare well in the world, 
Mencius could not give a definite answer. For a fact, there are many virtuous persons 
suffering misfortunes. Mencius said, 
Shun rose from the fields; Fu Yue was raised to office from amongst the 
builders;…That is why tian, when it is about to place a great burden on a man, 
always first tests his resolution, exhausts his frame and makes him suffer 
starvation and hardship, frustrates his efforts so as to shake him from his mental 
lassitude, toughen his nature and make good his deficiencies.17 
Although Mencius argued that it is necessary for virtuous persons to suffer 
misfortune so as to enhance their abilities in future work, he did not guarantee that 
those who suffered misfortunes would be favored by tian in the end. In fact, to be 
favored by tian might require more conditions that are beyond human control.            
Mencius said, 
Shun and Yu differed from Yi greatly in the length of time they assisted the 
Emperor, and their sons differed as radically in their moral character. All this 
was due to tian and could not have been brought about by man. When a thing is 
                                                        
16 Mencius, 6A16. 
17 Mencius, 6B15. 
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done as though by no one, then it is the work of tian…18 
So, for Mencius, there are always some things beyond human control, which is the 
working of tian. In responding to a question about why he seemed to complain against 
tian, Mencius answered, 
This is one time; that was another time. Every five hundred years a true King 
should arise, and in the interval there should arise one from whom an age takes 
its name. From Chou to the present, it is over seven hundred years. The five 
hundred mark is passed; the time seems ripe. It must be that tian does not as yet 
wish to bring peace to the Empire. If it did, who is there in the present time other 
than myself? Why should I be unhappy?”19 
It seems that Mencius also showed a feeling that tian was unfair to him and his moral 
undertakings, which, Mencius believed, were right for his chaotic times and society. 
Thus, like Confucius, Mencius has no convincing answer as to why tian endows 
us with virtues but could not protect and favor the virtuous persons and their moral 
undertakings.20 This reminds us of Kant’s acknowledgement of the difficulties with 
acting morally when the efficacy of moral action for bringing about happiness is 
uncertain. In Kant’s view, such uncertainty discourages efforts to lead a fully moral 
life. While acting out of respect for the moral law without regard to happiness is the 
supreme good for Kant, the highest good requires virtue to be rewarded with 
happiness. Kant could only solve the problem of the highest good by postulating 
                                                        
18 Mencius, 5A6. 
19 Mencius, 2B13. 
20 See also Mencius, 2.14, 2.16, 9.6. 
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immortality and the existence of God.21 In the absence of a similar religious tradition, 
how could the Confucians reconcile virtue with happiness? Xunzi’s answer is modern 
and Confucian in its humanistic emphasis: if the highest good is possible, it must 
come about by human efforts alone, human efforts made in finding better ways of 
knowing the world, and better ways of moral cultivation. 
 
Xunzi’s Tian Lun: Departure from Confucius and Mencius 
Xunzi’s view of tian is mostly presented in the essay of Tian Lun (Discourse on 
Heaven), and occasionally appears in other places of the text, such as Wang Zhi (On 
the Regulations of a King) and Li Lun (Discourse on Ritual Principles).  
 
Tian as Nature 
In Wang Zhi, Xunzi said, “Heaven (Tian) and Earth (di) are the beginning of life.”22 
Xunzi regarded both heaven (tian) and earth (di) as the origin of the myriad living 
things.  
…[W]when Heaven (tian) and Earth (di) conjoin, the myriad things are begot; 
when the Yin and Yang principles combine, transformations and transmutations 
are produced……23 
The combination of Yin and Yang principles, which represent the proceeding rules of 
heaven and earth, drives the transformation and transmutation of the myriad things. 
                                                        
21 Refer to Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Kant's Philosophy of Religion,” see 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-religion/#3.3, 2005. 
22 Xunzi, vol. 2, 9.15. 
23 Xunzi, vol. 3, 19.6. 
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Xunzi’s view of tian apparently deviated from that of Confucius and Mencius. 
As discussed before, both Confucius and Mencius regarded tian as the moral heaven 
which could decide the moral mission and fate of humans; while in Xunzi’s view, tian 
has no such moral function and it is closer to nature that gives birth to humans and all 
the other things. Although Xunzi’s view of tian as nature is different from that of 
Confucius and Mencius, it is interestingly similar to that of Zhuangzi.  
Heaven (tian) and earth (di) are the father and mother of the ten thousand things. 
They join to become a body; they part to become a beginning.24 
    When Heaven (tian) gives birth to the ten thousand people, it is certain to have 
jobs to assign them.25 
Thus, both Xunzi and Zhuangzi regarded tian as the nature that gives rise to the 
myriad things, including humans. Such striking similarity indicates that Xunzi might 
have borrowed some teachings of tian from Zhuangzi to reconstruct his Confucian 
view of tian. But before we can safely say this, let us further examine Xunzi’s view of 
tian and its relationship with humans, within which we might find some more 
interesting relationships between these two thinkers. 
 
Tian and Humans 
In Xunzi’s view, as one of the myriad things, a human is created by tian and di. So, 
what is the relationship between tian and humans like?  
The course of tian is constant: it does not survive because of the actions of a Yao; 
                                                        
24 Watson, The Complete works of Chuang Tzu, chap. 19, p. 198. 
25 Watson, The Complete works of Chuang Tzu, chap. 12, p. 130. 
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it does not perish because of the actions of a Jie. If you respond to the constancy 
of tian’s course with good government, there will be good fortune; if you 
respond to it with disorder, there will be misfortune…Accordingly, there will be 
famine when neither heat nor cold has reached you, and there will be misfortune 
even though inauspicious and freak events have not occurred…yet you can have 
no cause to curse tian, for these things are the consequences of the way that you 
have followed. Accordingly, if you understand the division between tian and 
mankind, then you can properly be called a “Perfect Man.”26  
For Xunzi, humans should not blame tian for the natural disasters and catastrophes 
they encounter. In fact, these disasters are mostly caused by humans themselves and 
the reasons are: 1) Humans disregard the rules of tian when performing agricultural 
activities and other activities related to the natural tian; and 2) Humans do not create a 
good social order and good government to respond to the catastrophe.  
Humans could not avoid the involvement of natural tian in an agricultural society. 
The myriad things including humans should heed the constant rules of tian in order to 
nurture their growth and development.27 Tian and humans and other living things are 
closely related with each other instead of being separated from each other. In this 
respect, “the division between tian and humans” only means that humans should not 
attribute the calamities they encounter to tian; rather the fault is with humans not 
taking into account the workings of the seasons or other aspects of nature. In 
contemporary vocabulary, a project that does not take into account the laws of nature 
                                                        
26 Xunzi, vol. 3, 17.1. 
27 Refer to Xunzi, vol. 3, 17.2b. 
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will not succeed. In this respect, we should not regard natural disasters as the 
expression of tian’s punishment of vicious people.  
Humans rather than tian are responsible for the losses ensuing from natural 
catastrophes, since they result from humans not responding to the constant way of 
natural tian with a good government. For Xunzi, these natural disasters are the 
constant way of tian, which can occur in any time and place. Although humans could 
not control the occurrence of natural disasters, they could do something to curb or 
lessen the negative consequences of these disasters. That is to say, humans should 
construct an orderly society and a good government to counter or mitigate the bad 
consequences of natural catastrophe. If an irresponsible government does not respond 
to the calamities in a timely manner, the negative consequences of natural 
catastrophes would cause more suffering than necessary. So, a good and responsible 
government is needed to deal with these natural calamities. 
In Xunzi’s view, even if natural catastrophe does not occur, a disaster would also 
occur if humans could not construct a good government. Without flood or drought, 
famine could still happen through bad management; without heat or cold, sickness 
could still occur in people—all these “human disasters” (renyao 人祆) are caused by 
the fault of humans not developing a good government and good social order, which 
guarantees the safety and happiness of people. If a government is cruel to the people, 
the people will lack food, die of sickness, etc. All these phenomena are similar to 
those of natural disasters in causing human suffering. However, they are not caused 
by natural disasters but result from a malfunctioning government. 
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Both Xunzi and Zhuangzi regarded tian as nature, and not the moral authority 
who could decide the moral mission and fate of human beings. Thus, whether the 
virtuous people encounter fortune or misfortune could not be attributed to tian since 
tian is amoral nature. Zhuangzi also attributed this to the fault of humans themselves.  
Yi Er Zi went to see Xu You. Xu You said, “What kind of assistance has Yao 
been giving you?” Yi Er Zi said, “Yao told me, ‘You must learn to practice 
benevolence and righteousness and to speak clearly about right and wrong!’” 
“Then why come to see me?” said Xu You. “Yao has already tattooed you with 
benevolence (ren) and righteousness (yi) and cut off your nose with right and 
wrong. Now how do you expect to go wandering in any far-way, carefree, and 
as-you-like-it paths?”28 
This dialogue demonstrates that benevolence, righteousness, right, and wrong are all 
humans’ inventions that could hurt humans themselves. However, as we know, 
benevolence and righteousness are just what Confucians struggle to cultivate. So, 
Zhuangzi attributed the misfortunes humans encountered to conventional (Confucian) 
morality among other things. In the Zhuangzi, Jie Yu, a recluse of state of Chu, 
lamented the situation of the sage in his times: 
When the world has the Way, the sage succeeds; when the world is without the 
Way, the sage survives. In times like the present, we do well to escape penalty. 
Good fortune is light as a feather, but nobody knows how to hold it up. 
Misfortune is heavy as the earth, but nobody knows how to stay out of its way.29  
                                                        
28 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, chap. 6, p. 89. 
29 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, chap. 4, p. 66. 
 82 
This depicts a contemporary attitude on how to live wisely in a time of chaos. For Jie 
Yu, it seems that the moral cultivation would even lead to the misfortunes. Jie Yu’s 
project of retiring from society and living a private life seems to be more attractive 
than that of Confucius and Mencius. This is because the latter could not persuade 
people to conduct moral cultivation as they could not determine whether one would 
meet fortunes or misfortunes as a result of moral cultivation. Thus, one would be 
tempted to ask why the people should not choose to live outside society and keep their 
lives intact, as Jie Yu suggests?  
Xunzi responded to such challenges by assimilating Zhuangzi’s point that the 
misfortunes humans encountered could not be attributed to tian but should be blamed 
on humans themselves. However, Xunzi’s assimilation was not without 
reservation—Xunzi regarded the misfortunes as due to human fault of not heeding the 
natural rules of tian or not establishing a good government while Zhuangzi viewed 
moral cultivation as the origin of misfortunes. In this sense, Xunzi thought that human 
effort in moral cultivation is so far from satisfactory that the misfortunes could not be 
avoided while Zhuangzi deemed that it is human effort in moral cultivation that 
resulted in these misfortunes.  
Zhuangzi’s and Xunzi’s views that tian and humans should be divided are 
different from that of Confucius and Mencius since in the latter’s view, tian and 
humans are related in terms of morality. In Confucius’ and Mencius’ views, the 
realms of tian and humans have the same rules and values, that is, morality. As 
discussed before, such a moral view of tian leads directly to the conclusion that 
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humans should complete the moral mission tian decrees, even if tian does not always 
favor the virtuous persons. Such a way of moral persuasion is not effective since 
people would certainly be concerned with realistic outcomes. Zhuangzi’s naturalistic 
view of tian might have given some ideas to Xunzi in his search for a more plausible 
relationship between tian and human that pointed to a possible road to better results in 
reconciling virtue and happiness, or at least not allowing one to undermine the other.  
As for why the virtuous or moral undertakings could not be achieved in his time, 
Xunzi also provided an answer. The chaos and disorders in that age made the rulers 
indifferent to Confucian moral teachings and this directly resulted in the failure of 
Confucian moral undertakings. However, we should not blame tian or the times, but 
should seek the cause in the inadequacies of Confucian teachings, which are not 
practical for attaining the Confucian moral ideal in the time of late Warring States 
period. So, the teachings of Confucius and Mencius should be improved. 
Thus, it seems that Xunzi incorporated some teachings from Zhuangzi to 
improve Confucianism to be more adaptable to the time. For Xunzi, it seems that it is 
humans themselves who could achieve the highest good. We should not depend on 
tian or God to bestow happiness on humans; instead, we should depend on ourselves 
to acquire happiness. 
    Although Xunzi assimilated some teachings from Zhuangzi regarding tian, the 
point Xunzi is more concerned with is how to “conform to the Way” that would 
produce a good social order and government. Conforming to the Way in Xunzi 
includes cultivating humans to be moral and to behave according to the rituals and 
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moral principles. Although tian provides the nurture with which the myriad things 
including humans could live, there are some other things more important for humans: 
the rituals and moral principles the sage created. To create, preserve and transmit the 
rituals and moral principles is the primary task for the sage.  
This is the basic distinction between Zhuangzi and Xunzi in their views on tian 
and humans. In Zhuangzi’s view, to cope with human affairs means attaining 
integration with tian. So, in this respect, Zhuangzi’s emphasis on human affairs is 
only for the purpose of attaining the way of tian. On the contrary, Xunzi regarded 
human affairs as the most important thing for humans to be involved in, if not the sole 
objective and tian is merely the environment or conditions that must be appropriately 
managed to achieve the human goal. To achieve an orderly human society and a good 
government is Xunzi’s goal. Xunzi said, 
Men are born with desires which, if not satisfied,…lead to disorder. Disorder 
leads to poverty. The Ancient Kings…established the regulations contained 
within rituals and moral principle in order to apportion things, to nurture the 
desire of men, and to supply the means for their satisfaction.30 
In Xunzi’s view, although Zhuangzi focused on tian as the way of keeping one’s life 
intact, he did not realize that humans could not do so without a good social order, 
which results from the moral cultivation guided by li and moral principles. It is in this 
respect that moral cultivation plays a key role in keeping up a good social order and 
keeping life intact for a person. Having acknowledged this, we are now in a better 
                                                        
30 Xunzi, vol. 3, 19.1a. 
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position to understand Xunzi’s verdict in Jie Bi (Dispelling Errors) that “Zhuangzi 
was blinded by tian and was insensible to men.”31 
Xunzi was not saying that Zhuangzi did not care about humans and only sought 
to integrate with tian. Zhuangzi indeed emphasized the importance of keeping life 
intact in a time of chaos. However, Zhuangzi’s approach of achieving such Daoist 
ideal is to integrate with tian instead of resorting to human efforts. This approach is 
what Xunzi objected to. In Xunzi’s view, without moral cultivation, there will be no 
good social order, which would only subject human life to the dangers of disorders.  
Although Zhuangzi was criticized by Xunzi for not resorting to human morality 
to keep life intact, his claim that nourishing life and keeping life intact is the most 
important thing for a person to do is especially significant in the time of chaos. In this 
sense, it posed a great challenge to Confucius’ and Mencius’ teachings of moral 
cultivation since the latter could not even guarantee the safety of human life while the 
former could at least provide an approach for keeping life intact. This is also the 
reason why Xunzi assimilated some teachings from Zhuangzi to strengthen 
Confucianism in this respect, but he stopped well short of agreeing with Zhuangzi’s 
rejection of Confucian morality. 
As tian is amoral in Xunzi’s view, it seems that human xing, which is endowed 
by the natural tian, has no moral elements in itself. Based on the assumption of 
natural tian, Xunzi formulated his own view of human xing, that is, that human xing is 
bad. However, in Mencius, since tian is moral, human xing endowed by tian is also 
                                                        
31 Xunzi, vol. 3, 21.4. 
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good. Thus, Mencius and Xunzi held totally contrary views on human xing, which is a 
central debate within pre-Qin Confucianism.  
 
Xing is Good 
Although Confucius said little about xing, much less the relationship between tian and 
xing, Mencius examined the relationship between tian and xing in detail. Mencius 
regarded tian as the moral heaven that endows humans with moral sprouts,32 which 
distinguish humans from animals. Mencius claimed that once a person has developed 
these four moral sprouts in the heart into full-blown moral qualities that could be 
practiced and observed in everyday life, he could be said to have known the xing of 
human beings and tian.33 Thus, we could see how Mencius’ view of moral tian 
affects his view of xing: Since tian is the moral heaven that endows humans with 
moral sprouts, and human xing lies just in these moral sprouts, then moral heaven 
directly gives birth to moral human xing (that is, the moral sprouts). But does xing 
really refer only to the moral sprouts humans possess? Mencius seems inconsistent at 
times, e.g. in 7B24, sensory desires seem to be the xing of human beings. The reason 
why xing could include sensory desires may also be attributed to Mencius’ view of 
tian. Although tian is moral in the view of Mencius, tian is also the creator of all 
myriad things. In this sense, tian comes very close to “nature,” 34  which not 
surprisingly includes sensory desires. So, xing in Mencius includes both sensory 
desires and moral sprouts.  
                                                        
32 Mencius, 2A6. 
33 Refer to Mencius, 7A1. 
34 Refer to Mencius, 1A6, 4B26. 
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Consider 7B24 again:  
The way the mouth is disposed towards tastes, the eye towards colors, the ear 
towards sounds, the nose towards smells, and the four limbs towards ease is 
human xing, yet therein also lies the ming. That is why the gentleman does not 
describe it as xing. The way benevolence pertains to the relation between father 
and son, duty to the relation between prince and subject, the rites to the relation 
between guest and host, wisdom to the good and wise man, the sage to the way 
of Heaven, is the ming, but therein also lies human xing. That is why the 
gentleman does not describe it as ming.35 
In Mencius, the difference between a gentleman and a petty person lies in their 
attitudes towards how to treat sensory desires and moral inclinations in their xing. A 
petty person would abandon persisting in the moral inclinations in his heart. He would 
like to follow sensory desires which is easy, although whether he satisfies these 
desires or not is unknown and therefore a matter of ming. Faced with the choice 
between sensory desires and moral mission, the petty person would choose to seek 
sensory satisfaction since it would be much more difficult to attain the moral ideal.  
The gentleman would have a different attitude. He would regard the satisfaction 
of sensory desires as a matter of contingency, determined as it is by ming. He would 
abandon seeking satisfaction of sensory desires and persist in the gentlemen’s 
learning. This point is just what Confucius said, 
If wealth were a permissible pursuit, I would be willing even to act as a guard 
                                                        
35 Mencius, 7B24. 
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holding a whip outside the market place. If it is not, I shall follow my own 
preferences.36 
In fact, for a gentleman, even if it is more difficult to attain the moral ideal, he would 
adhere to moral principles, and every step he took is an accumulation in the process of 
attaining the moral ideal. Once he is willing to study, he would achieve some positive 
fruits in the process of attaining the moral ideal, even if he could not attain it in the 
end. Faced with the choice between sensory satisfaction and moral ideal, the 
gentleman would choose the moral ideal as his primary goal. In Mencius, the 
gentleman should pay more attention to the elaboration of the moral sprouts innate in 
the heart instead of seeking to satisfy his sensory desires because sensory organs are 
easily misled by external things and not reliable in guiding us to be gentlemen.37 
For Mencius, what could be called xing refers less to sensory desires and more to 
the moral sprouts innate in our heart/mind, whose existence and natural growth shows 
how to cultivate oneself to be a gentleman. In other words, xing is not simply 
everything we are born with but also that which distinguishes us as human beings. In 
this sense, xing is naturally good when it comes to the discussion of moral cultivation. 
Mencius’ view of human xing as good was nevertheless challenged by many 
contemporaries. Gaozi, for example, disputed with him on this topic. In a dialogue 
with Mencius, Gaozi claimed that human xing is neither good nor bad, that is, human 
xing is neutral. Gaozi compared human xing to water, which could flow to the east if 
there is some crack in the east bank, or to the west if there is some crack in the west 
                                                        
36 The Analects, 7.12. 
37 Refer to Mencius, 6A15. 
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bank. Contradicting Gaozi’s argument, Mencius said, 
Human nature (xing) is good just as water seeks low ground. There is no man 
who is not good; there is no water that does not flow downwards.38 
In Mencius, whether water flows to the west or east is not the xing of water but the 
outcome of external circumstances (the crack in the bank).  
It is true that the flow of water to the east or west may result from external 
circumstances; however, Mencius could not deny that the tendency for water to flow 
downwards might still be due to factors such as the slope of the land. Can we imagine 
that water could still flow downwards when it is on a level ground? Thus, if xing 
could be compared to water, xing itself has no moral inclination to be good. Instead, 
whatever xing becomes is determined by the external circumstances or environment. 
In this case, Mencius’ argument does not seem convincing. 
Mencius compared the xing of the Ox Mountain to that of human beings. As the 
trees in the Ox Mountain are all chopped down, the mountain seems never to have the 
trees growing on it. This is not because the mountain originally has no trees, but the 
chopping caused the lack of trees on the mountain. Mencius thus argued that the four 
moral sprouts in the common people are just like the fate of the trees on the mountain. 
The common people did not nourish them; in fact, they even chopped and annihilated 
them. In this case, the four moral sprouts could not grow up into a full-grown tree. If 
someone sees such situation and regards the immorality as proving that the xing of 
human beings is not moral, he would be as mistaken as one who concludes from the 
                                                        
38 Mencius, 6A2. 
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state of the Ox Mountain during Mencius’ time that it is by nature treeless. In fact, if 
we could see how the gentleman cultivates and nourishes the moral sprouts in their 
xing, we would not arrive at such a conclusion.  
Mencius’ explanation of why so many people behave badly despite good human 
nature is far from satisfactory. Mencius argued that the reason why so many people 
become bad is that they could not adequately nurture their moral sprouts. However, 
since human xing is good in nature, why do people neglect or even hate to nurture the 
moral sprouts? Mencius explained that moral sprouts are only in the stage of sprouts, 
which need a good environment and nurturance so as to develop itself. Still, how do 
we know that people who behave badly in reality do not do so because they do not 
have those moral sprouts? Since we could not know that moral sprouts exist except by 
projecting backwards from the behavior of good people, how could we conclude that 
human xing is good from the vicious behaviors of bad people? It seems that Mencius 
could not explain this problem adequately. 
 
Xing is Bad 
In Xing E, Xunzi criticized Mencius as follows: 
Mencius contended that “since man can learn, his nature is good.” 
I say that this is not so. It shows that Mencius did not reach any real 
understanding of what man’s inborn nature (xing) is and that he did not 
investigate the division between those things that are inborn in man and those 
that are acquired…What cannot be gained by learning and cannot be mastered by 
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application yet is found in man is properly termed “inborn nature.” What must be 
learned before a man can do it and what he must apply himself to before he can 
master it yet is found in man is properly called “acquired nature (wei).” This is 
precisely the distinction between “inborn” and “acquired” natures.39 
Xunzi argued that Mencius was confused about the division between inborn nature 
and acquired nature, that is, xing and wei. In Xunzi’s view, xing is what humans are 
born with. Rituals and moral principles are what humans acquired through learning. It 
is because human xing is bad and not satisfactory that people need to learn the rituals 
and moral principles to cultivate their xing. If human xing is good, just as Mencius 
claimed, we will only depend on our moral voluntariness to develop the moral sprouts 
to be mature. This is a very risky strategy as we really do not know whether people 
would develop these moral sprouts voluntarily or not. In this case, if we believe 
human xing is bad, we could at least devise some practical method, such as li and fa, 
to make people behave well, and even more ambitious, to cultivate them to be moral. 
Having disagreed with Mencius on the moral characteristics of tian, Xunzi 
inevitably disagreed with him about whether xing is good. Since tian in Xunzi is just 
like nature and has no moral elements in itself, xing that is endowed by tian should 
also have no moral qualities.  
 
Xing and Its Implications 
Xunzi regarded xing as what human beings are born with. He said, 
                                                        
39 Xunzi, vol. 3, 23.1c. 
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What characterizes a man from birth is called his nature (xing). What is produced 
out of the harmony of inborn nature, out of the sensibilities of the organ tallying 
as the senses respond to stimuli, and what from birth is effortless and 
spontaneous are called xing.40 
Thus, xing is inborn human nature. It includes no artificial element. In Xunzi’s view, 
xing is endowed by tian—“Xing is the consequence of tian.”41 Since tian is the 
amoral nature in Xunzi’s view, does it mean that human xing, which is endowed by 
tian, is also amoral, i.e. neither good nor bad? It is not the case. Xunzi argued that 
xing consists of various emotions (qing). 
The feelings of liking and disliking, of delight and anger, and of sorrow and joy 
that are inborn in our xing are called emotions.42 
We should notice that the term qing in the Xunzi is a much broader category 
referring to various capacities of the human being other than the emotions. It also 
refers to the desires in humans. Xunzi said, 
A people that are not made prosperous will have no means of caring for the 
needs of their essential natures (qing). A people that are not taught will have no 
means of introducing rational order into their inborn nature (xing).43 
Now, it is the xing of man that when hungry he desires something to eat, that 
when cold he wants warm clothing, and that when weary he desires rest—such 
are essential qualities inherent in his qing and xing (情性).44 
                                                        
40 Xunzi, vol. 3, 22.1b. 
41 Xunzi, vol. 3, 22.5b. 
42 Xunzi, vol. 3, 22.5b. 
43 Xunzi, vol. 3, 27.52. 
44 Xunzi, vol. 3, 23.1e. 
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As seen in above passages, qing refers to not only the emotions of humankind, but 
also the biological nature of human beings. It is human xing that humans have desires 
for food, clothes, etc. Thus, when humans feel hungry, they will seek food; when they 
feel cold, they will seek warm clothes—such is the biological nature of humankind. 
Thus, in Xunzi’s view, human xing consists of various emotions and desires. If a 
person indulges himself in sensory pleasures and desires without any moderation, he 
will be regarded as a beast instead of a man.45 The outcome of animals following 
original xing is plenty of fierce wars and struggles among them, which make the weak 
prey for the strong. In this case, under the assumption that human xing is full of 
unruly desires and emotions, if humans only follow their original xing, just like 
animals, humans would also fall into the struggles and wars for food, sex, etc., and 
human society would fall into chaos. Thus, Xunzi firmly believed that human xing is 
bad. It is in this sense that Xunzi believed that a person should restrain himself from 
seeking the satisfaction of desires and enjoying pleasures excessively and should 
cultivate their xing according to the moral principles invented by the sage. 
Although Xunzi rejected the idea that moral sprouts or qualities endowed by tian 
exist in the xing, he believed some other faculties besides emotions and desires also 
belong to xing. For Xunzi, the senses also belong to the xing. He said, “Now, it 
belongs to the xing of man that the eye is able to see and the ear to hear.”46 In 
addition, the faculty of knowing also belongs to the xing. 
As a general principle, the faculty of knowing belongs to the xing of man. That 
                                                        
45 Refer to Xunzi, vol. 1, 6.2. 
46 Xunzi, vol. 3, 23.1d. 
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things are knowable is a part of the natural principle of order of things. Men use 
their innate faculty of knowing to seek the natural principles of order, which 
allow things to be known.47 
Xing not only consists of irrational and unruly emotions, but also the faculty of 
knowing, which allows for the cultivation of xing. In fact, if we have no such faculty 
of knowing, we could not grasp the essence of rituals and moral principles and 
voluntarily act according to them, even though the rituals and moral principles 
continuously instruct us on what we should or should not be doing. This also indicates 
that in Xunzi’s view, rituals and moral principles are not something imposed on 
people totally coercively, but should transform human xing from the inside and the 
faculty of knowing should understand the rituals and moral principles. 
Xing itself includes the faculty of knowing, which makes the cultivation of xing 
possible. In Xunzi’s view, xing is bad while it still retains the potential capacity of 
being transformed to be good due to the existence of the faculty of knowing. Although 
the faculty of knowing is not actually bad, it is by no means good since it is only a 
potential quality humans have and not the good talent or morality already existing in 
the xing.  
In Xunzi’s view, human xing is bad and this is the reason why the conscious 
effort is needed. Human xing is full of aggressiveness, greed, envy, and such which, 
without the regulation and cultivation of conscious effort (wei), would cause one to 
deviate from the right track. In the beginning of Xing E, Xunzi said, 
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Human xing is bad; any good in humans is acquired by conscious exertion. Now, 
the nature of man is such that he is born with a love of profit.…This being the 
case, when each person follows his inborn nature and indulges his natural 
inclinations, aggressiveness and greed are certain to develop.48 
Thus, Xunzi explicitly argued that human xing is bad, which is in sharp contrast with 
Mencius’ view of human xing as good. Although the distinction between Xunzi and 
Mencius in terms of xing is widely acknowledged in current scholarship, the reason 
why Xunzi departed from Mencius in this respect is not sufficiently explained in 
current scholarship. 49 In my view, Xunzi’s departure from Mencius in terms of xing 
is because he considered Mencius’ theory of human nature to be implausible and 
pernicious in having the effect of discouraging people from the efforts needed for 
moral cultivation. In Xunzi’s view, since xing is bad and we have no moral sprouts in 
ourselves, if people are not cultivated by rituals and moral principles, and they do not 
make conscious effort in learning and practicing rituals and moral principles, there 
will be chaos and disorders in human society. 
In addition, for Xunzi, since human xing is bad, we should not expect people to 
cultivate themselves to be good voluntarily; instead, we should depend on inspiring 
teachers and moral exemplars to influence people to learn li and fa, which will 
regulate and cultivate their xing to be moral. Compared with Mencius, Xunzi 
emphasized more on external education and exemplar, instead of merely expecting 
people to conduct moral cultivation voluntarily. Such argument is more realistic than 
                                                        
48 Xunzi, vol. 3, 23.1a. 
49 Burton Watson, trans. Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, Hsun Tzu and Han Fei Tzu (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1967), p. 5. 
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Mencius’ since it takes into account the fact that people would not like to conduct 
moral cultivation voluntarily in reality, especially in a time of chaos. Xunzi told us 
that we should not expect too much for human xing and regard human xing as 
possessing an innate moral sense of cultivating itself. A more feasible measure is to 
cultivate human xing through the moral instruction instituted by the sage. For Xunzi, 
to achieve the Confucian moral goal of being a gentleman, this would be a much more 
effective and realistic approach. 
Here, we should notice that Xunzi did not intend to eliminate desires and 
emotions totally. In fact, Xunzi did admit desires and emotions should be satisfied to 
some extent. Moral cultivation can transform these desires into a controllable form so 
that they could be satisfied easily instead of being repressed totally. In this way, 
human desires and materials in the society could be balanced to some extent. In 
Xunzi’s view, whether someone would like to conduct moral cultivation voluntarily 
might not be so important; the more important thing is to learn li and fa under the 
influence of awe inspiring teachers and exemplars so that people could achieve the 
goal of moral cultivation on one hand, and could live in the society without worrying 
about their living needs on the other hand. If such external cultivation succeeds, 
people will then begin to behave morally voluntarily.  
Although Xunzi’s claim that human xing is bad is more persuasive than 
Mencius’ view that human xing is good, someone could still ask: if human nature is 
bad and no one is an exception to this, then how is it possible for some people to 
become sages, or sage kings? To put the question differently, how do the rules of li 
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get established in the first place?  
To answer this question, we need to examine Xunzi’s discussion of the origin of 
li. Xunzi said, 
How did li arise? I say that men are born with desires which, if not satisfied, 
cannot but lead men to seek to satisfy them. If in seeking to satisfy their desires 
men observe no measure and apportion things without limits, then it would be 
impossible for them not to contend over the means to satisfy their desires. Such 
contention leads to disorder. Disorder leads to poverty. The Ancient Kings 
abhorred such disorder; so they established the regulations contained within li in 
order to apportion things, to nurture the desires of men, and to supply the means 
for their satisfaction.50 
Thus, in Xunzi’s view, human xing is bad and no one (including the sage kings) is an 
exception. However, even if the sage king’s xing is bad, he realizes that if all people 
hunt for what they desire without any moderation, they will conflict with each other 
and the society would fall into a chaos. In this case, no one including themselves 
could survive in the society. To avoid such a situation, the sage kings have to design 
some codes of conduct, which is the origin of li, to regulate human behaviour and 
make sure that everyone in the society could survive in the world. The reason why the 
sage kings could establish li is not because his xing is good or has some good 
elements. Instead, the crucial point here is: if we all follow our own xing, we could 
not survive in the world. In this case, the establishment of li is the outcome of realistic 
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thinking rather than that of the sage kings’ good human xing. The reason why the sage 
king could establish li is that he realizes that li is the best way for achieving the public 
good. As Nivison observes, 
The paradox is perhaps resolved by the fact that philosophers, understanding that 
the good is in fact the “best” for them and all people, thereby give themselves 
reason to love it.51 
Xunzi’s view sounds familiar when we examine Hobbes’ text. Hobbes wrote, 
And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they 
cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end (which is 
principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only), 
endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another.52   
In this sense, Hobbes argued that the “Commonwealth”—prime covenant, should be 
established to guarantee human life. Such prime covenant is similar in motivation to 
what Xunzi defines as li, which works as the contracts regulating everyone’s activity. 
Thus, we might say that Xunzi is also a contractarian to some extent.53   
 
Xunzi and Shang Yang 
Xunzi’s view of bad human xing is quite similar to that of Shang Yang, who is 
considered the founder of Legalism.54 Shang Yang enacted numerous reforms in the 
state of Qin that changed Qin from a peripheral, backward state into a militarily 
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53 Paul Rakita Goldin also held such view. See his work, Rituals of the Way: The Philosophy of Xunzi (Chicago: 
Open Court, 1999), pp.62-69. 
54 As a systematic school, Legalism emerged in the movement of reform in the Warring States period, when Duke 
Xiao of Qin appointed Shang Yang as the prime minister to implement reforms. 
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powerful and strongly centralized state.55 He is the supposed author of the Shang Jun 
Shu, which claims that human xing is profit-loving.  
It is the nature of the people, when they are hungry, to strive for food; when they 
are tired, to strive for rest; when they suffer hardship, to seek enjoyment; when 
they are in a state of humiliation, to strive for honor. Such is the natural 
disposition of the people. If the people strive for gain, then they lose the rules of 
polite behavior…56 
Xunzi also said something similar to this.  
The xing of man is such that he is born with a love of profit. Following this 
nature will cause its aggressiveness and greedy tendencies to grow and courtesy 
and deference to disappear.57  
Such striking similarity with Shang Yang’s teachings and Xunzi’s experience in Qin58 
may prompt us to suppose that Xunzi was probably influenced by Shang Yang’s 
thinking to some extent. 
Although Xunzi was similar to Shang Yang in their views on human xing, their 
attitudes to the morality of human xing differ. It should be noted that Shang Yang 
only affirmed human xing as profit-loving, which is different from Xunzi’s moral 
judgment that human xing is bad. Shang Yang said, 
It is people’s nature, when measuring, to take the longest part, when weighing, to 
take the heaviest, when adjusting the scales, to seek profit. If an intelligent prince 
                                                        
55 Refer to Wikipedia, “Shang Yang”, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shang_Yang. 
56 J. J. L. Duyvendak, The Book of Lord Shang (London: Arthur Probsthain, 1928), p. 217. 
57 Xunzi, vol. 3, 23.1a. 
58 Refer to Xunzi, vol.1, pp. 20-22. 
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watches these three things diligently, order may be established in the country and 
the capacities of the people may be utilized.59 
Shang Yang did not intend to judge human xing morally. Instead, his primary concern 
was, by understanding human xing, to devise some kind of law and regulatory 
systems to rule the people instead of cultivating them to be moral. This is also the 
difference between Legalism and Confucianism. In Legalism, to cultivate and 
transform human xing is too slow, ineffective and even impossible in making a stable 
and strong state. In this case, laws and regulations would be much more effective and 
practical. However, for Confucians, moral cultivation is always important as it is an 
indispensable condition for making a good government. Xunzi adhered to this 
Confucian belief. For Xunzi, even if we could have an orderly society and stable state 
through the function of legal systems, we could not establish the highest level of good 
government without moral cultivation. What Xunzi tried to do is to achieve the 
Confucian moral and political ideals more effectively by allowing some room for 
external means of socialization in transforming the people and leading them to moral 
cultivation. 
    Although Xunzi and other Confucians all insisted on moral cultivation as 
necessary, Xunzi’s approach of persuading people to conduct moral cultivation is 
different from that of Confucius and Mencius. Such difference originates from 
Xunzi’s different view of tian and xing, which was probably influenced by 
non-Confucians. Xunzi might have utilized the new methodology of “emptiness, unity 
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and stillness (xu, yi and jing)” to assimilate Zhuangzian theory of tian and Shang 
Yang’s doctrine of human xing to reshape Confucianism in terms of moral cultivation. 
In the next chapter, we will see how Xunzi employs his view of human nature as the 




 CONFUCIAN POLITICAL TEACHINGS  
 
In Xunzi’s view, human xing is bad and this is the reason why people need to cultivate 
themselves morally. Confucius and Mencius emphasized the importance of a good 
government setting the example for people to lead a moral life. But if people are not 
willing to cultivate themselves, despite exemplary moral leaders, what could be done? 
Struggling with this problem led Xunzi to a very different, more pessimistic view of 
the nature of politics, and therefore different recommendations about how to achieve 
good government in comparison with Confucius and Mencius. This chapter aims to 
show how Xunzi borrowed from non-Confucians to modify the Confucian theory of 
good governance based on the understanding that human nature is bad. 
This chapter first discusses the different views of good government in Confucius, 
Mencius and Xunzi to show how Xunzi’s view of good government followed and 
developed that of Confucius while that of Mencius deviated from Confucius’. 
Confucius argued for li and allowed some room for fa in achieving a good 
government. Mencius neglected li and almost completely ignored fa as the approach 
to achieve a good government. In this case, Xunzi developed Confucius’ teachings of 
li and fa. He not only regarded li as necessary for achieving a good government, but 
also went beyond Confucius to regard fa as an indispensable way in cultivating the 
people to be moral.  
This chapter then investigates the different views of these three thinkers on wang 
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and ba. Due to their different understandings of ren government, both Confucius and 
Xunzi allowed some room for the morally imperfect ruler who nevertheless benefited 
the people to some extent. Thus, for both of them, ba should also be accepted as an 
acceptable alternative in governing. For Mencius, however, ba is not acceptable in 
governing. Mencius’ rejection of ba is not realistic at the time of the late Warring 
States period as most of the rulers at this time had no interest in moral cultivation and 
the moral ideal of wang. Xunzi was more realistic in allowing ba as an alternative in 
governance and provided a stronger theory of good government in terms of 
practicality and different possible achievements. Xunzi’s incorporation of fa and ba 
might have been influenced by Shang Yang, but Xunzi modified fa and ba to meet the 
need of improving Confucianism. 
 
Good Government  
Confucius’ View of Good Government 
In Confucius’ teachings, moral cultivation and state governance are not separated. For 
Confucius, to make an orderly state and good government, an official must learn to be 
moral in everyday practice. Confucius said, 
The rule of virtue (為政以德) can be compared to the Pole Star which commands 
the homage of the multitude of stars without leaving its place.1 
For Confucius, if an official could govern a state with virtue, people would support 
him like the stars surround the Pole Star. So, what are these virtues? Confucius said, 
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The gentleman is generous without its costing him anything, works others hard 
without their complaining, has desires without being greedy, is casual without 
being arrogant, and is awe-inspiring without appearing fierce.2 
For Confucius, only if an official could become upright by following these moral 
requirements, could he become an example for the people and lead the people with 
virtues. 
To govern is to be upright. If you set an example by being upright, who would 
dare do otherwise?3 
In another dialogue between Ji Kangzi and Confucius, Confucius compared the virtue 
of a gentleman to wind while that of the people to grass.4 For Confucius, the 
gentleman could influence the people to become moral, just as the grass would be 
blown down by the wind. Confucius seemed to believe that once a ruler or an official 
attains the moral ideal of gentleman, the people would also be prompted to cultivate 
themselves to become moral and preserve a good social order voluntarily.  
As Confucius would have it, politics should be the reflection of moral 
relationships among the people. Confucius argued for the principle of ren in dealing 
with human relationships, which is also the principle applicable for dealing with 
political matters. In 12.2, Confucius replied to the enquiry about ren as follows, 
When abroad behave as though you were receiving an important guest. When 
employing the services of the common people behave as though you were 
officiating at an important sacrifice. Do not impose on others what you yourself 
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4 Refer to The Analects, 12.19. 
 105 
do not desire. In this way you will be free from ill will whether in a state or in a 
noble family.5 
In this passage, ren is crystallized as the various kinds of practices in dealing with 
political matters. The principle of “do not impose on others what you yourself do not 
desire” (己所不欲，勿施於人) is not only the principle of dealing with human 
relationships, but also the political principle for governing. Aside from this principle, 
Confucius also described how to achieve ren whilst governing. He said, 
A benevolent man helps others to take their stand in so far as he himself wishes 
to take his stand, and get others there in so far as he himself wishes to get there 
(己欲立而立人，己欲達而達人).6 
Once the ruler extends to the people what he himself desires and refrains from 
imposing what he dislikes on the people, that is, once he achieves ren, he could 
achieve a good government.  
Although Confucius argued for a good government based on the moral 
cultivation of the ruler, he did allow some room for a kind of ruler who did not attain 
the highest moral level but still was able to benefit the people. For Confucius, such 
rulers could still be regarded as ren.7 In this case, it seems that Confucius deemed 
that there are two levels of ren government: the higher level is the government based 
on the moral cultivation or benevolence of the ruler; the lower level is the government 
based on the actual benefits and welfare a ruler could bring about for the people. For 
the first level, Confucius required the ruler to cultivate himself to the point of being 
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benevolent; for the second, Confucius seemed not to require such high moral 
achievements—once the ruler could benefit the people substantially, he could be 
regarded as a good ruler and the government correspondingly a good government. 
 
Mencius’ View of Ren Government 
Mencius explicitly put forward the ideal of renzheng, which is a moral government 
that requires rulers and ministers to cultivate themselves morally. Mencius said, 
There is a common expression, “The Empire, the state, the family”. The Empire 
has its basis in the state, the state in the family, and the family in one’s own self.8 
In Mencius, the self is transformed by moral cultivation. In this case, the importance 
of moral cultivation lies not only in transforming the self but is also the foundation of 
preserving an orderly state. The reason why the self is significant in the preservation 
of an orderly state lies in the fact that the state is composed of various kinds of selves, 
including the ruler, officials and people. If all these people could conduct moral 
cultivation voluntarily, the state would become orderly. Otherwise, the state would fall 
into chaos. If moral cultivation is so important in preserving an orderly state, how 
does it work?  
First, Mencius deemed that the ruler should be cultivated to be moral. Once the 
ruler becomes moral through moral cultivation, the people would follow the moral 
way accordingly. 
When the prince is benevolent, everyone else is benevolent; when the prince is 
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dutiful, everyone else is dutiful; when the prince is correct, everyone else is 
correct. Simply by rectifying the prince one can put the state on a firm basis.9 
Mencius argued that rulers should “devote themselves to goodness, forgetting their 
own exalted position.”10 That is to say, a ruler should put more stress on cultivating 
himself to be moral instead of acquiring property and power. For Mencius, morality is 
indispensable for becoming a good ruler. In other places, Mencius specified moral 
qualities such as respectfulness and frugality as the moral qualities that a ruler should 
possess.11  
Second, Mencius regarded the minister as another important factor in achieving 
the goal of good government. In Mencius, the official position should only be 
occupied by the virtuous. Only if these are employed as officials in a state, would the 
state become orderly.12  
Nevertheless, Mencius doubted whether a virtuous person always gets the 
official position or even become the ruler in the end. In fact, to be a ruler might 
presuppose opportunities or external conditions not related to one’s moral 
achievement. 
A common man who comes to possess the Empire must not only have the virtue 
of a Shun or a Yu but also the recommendation of an Emperor. That is why 
Confucius never possessed the Empire.13 
Mencius noticed the gap between ideal and reality. Being moral did not make 
                                                        
9 Mencius, 4A20. 
10 Mencius, 7A8. 
11 See Mencius, 4A16. 
12 See Mencius, 2A4. 
13 Mencius, 5A6. 
 108 
Confucius a ruler. On the contrary, a person who is not so perfect in moral 
achievement might become a ruler. Mencius noted the mistakes of rulers who were 
clearly not wise.14 For Mencius, although an immoral person could become a ruler, 
he must cultivate himself morally so as to become a good ruler in the future. Without 
moral cultivation, the ruler could never become a good ruler. In this sense, Mencius 
never abandoned the effort of persuading rulers to cultivate themselves. For Mencius, 
moral cultivation of the imperfect ruler is more important than just expecting a 
virtuous person to become a ruler one day.  
Both the ruler and minister should have moral qualities in governing, which is an 
indispensable condition of becoming a sage king or good minister. On the contrary, if 
the ruler or minister is not benevolent, the state would be endangered. 
An Emperor cannot keep the Empire within the Four Seas unless he is 
benevolent; a feudal lord cannot preserve the altars to the gods of earth and grain 
unless he is benevolent; A Minister or a Counselor cannot preserve his ancestral 
temple unless he is benevolent; a Gentleman or a Commoner cannot preserve his 
four limbs unless he is benevolent.15  
Thus, whether a ruler or minister is benevolent or not determines the fate of a state. As 
we can see in above passage, for Mencius, moral cultivation should not only cultivate 
the ruler or minister, but also transform the nature of common people. Only when the 
common people are educated to be moral, is it possible for the state to become 
                                                        
14 Refer to Mencius, 2B9. 
15 Mencius, 4A3. 
 109 
orderly.16  
Thus for Mencius, a good government requires the moral cultivation of the ruler 
and ministers. But how does such moral cultivation make it happen? Mencius said, 
Treat the aged of your own family in a manner befitting their venerable age and 
extend this treatment to the aged of other families; treat your own young in a 
manner befitting their tender age and extend this to the young of other families, 
and you can roll the Empire on your palm…In other words, all you have to do is 
take this very heart here and apply it to what is over there.17 
Mencius believed that once everyone in the world, whether he be a ruler, minister or 
common person, cultivates himself morally and extends the benevolence with which 
he treats his families to others, the whole state would become orderly and a good 
government would come into being. Mencius’ project followed Confucius’ teachings 
that “do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire (jisuobuyu, 
wushiyuren)” and “A benevolent man helps others to take their stand in so far as he 
himself wishes to take his stand, and get others there in so far as he himself wishes to 
get there (jiyuli er liren, jiyuda er daren).” Mencius argued that a person should not 
only refrain from imposing on others what he himself does not desire, but also need to 
extend what he desires and likes to others. Similar to Confucius, Mencius also applied 
the moral principle of ren, which is a fundamental principle of dealing with human 
relationships, in modeling a good government. This indicates that Mencius further 
developed Confucius’ teachings that ethics and government should be integrated. But 
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unlike Confucius, Mencius did not regard those who have not attained the highest 
level as ren, even if they had benefitted the people much. For Mencius, they are very 
trivial.18 This suggests that Mencius only thought of the ren government as one 
wherein rulers and ministers were ren. For Mencius, even if a government could keep 
up an orderly society, it could not be called a ren government unless the ruler and 
ministers are cultivated to be ren. 
Mencius’ view of ren government seems too idealistic to be achieved. Mencius’ 
envisaging of ren government dispels the possible model that the ruler might not be 
morally perfect even if he promotes the welfare of the people. But for Confucius, such 
a morally imperfect ruler could still contribute to the construction of ren government 
and benefit the people. Thus, in comparison with Confucius, Mencius seemed too 
rigid. The time of late Warring States period urgently needed an orderly society, which 
might be provided by those rulers who are not so morally perfect but who could 
benefit the people by maintaining an orderly society. In this case, it seems unrealistic 
to rely only on the moral cultivation of the rulers to achieve the Confucian political 
ideal of good government.  
 
Xunzi’s View of Good Government 
For Xunzi, the highest level of good government is also a ren government, in which 
the ruler’s benevolence and love are extended to the people. Xunzi said, 
His [referring to the True King] humanity (ren) is the loftiest in the world, his 
                                                        
18 Refer to Mencius, 2A1. 
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justice the most admirable, and his majesty the most marvelous. His humanity 
being the loftiest is the cause of no one in the world being estranged from him.19 
It is because the ruler is benevolent to the people that the people would love the ruler. 
So, ren for Xunzi necessarily involves “loving others”, just like Confucius’ and 
Mencius’ descriptions of ren. 
That humanity (ren) of which I spoke indeed involve loving others, but it is just 
such love for others that causes a hatred of whoever does injury to them…20 
In Xunzi’s view, not only should the ruler become benevolent, but the ministers 
should also act according to benevolent principles.21  
Thus, Xunzi is quite similar to Mencius in describing ren government. However, 
when we continue to examine the text of Xunzi, we find some more interesting facts: 
Thus, to elevate the worthy and employ the able; to place them in a ranked 
hierarchy, eminent to base; to distinguish between near and far relatives; and to 
assign precedence according to age from old to young—such was the Way of the 
Ancient Kings…Hence, one who is humane (ren) will be humane in regard to 
these matters…22 
For Xunzi, to require a ruler to extend his benevolence to other people might not be 
practical; instead, what is practical to do is to secure the social distinctions and social 
hierarchy in a good order, which will benefit the people too. In Xunzi’s view, this is 
also the benevolence extended to the people as the people indeed benefited from such 
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20 Xunzi, vol. 2, 15.2. 
21 See Xunzi, vol. 2, 12.8a. 
22 Xunzi, vol. 3, 24.5. 
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normative social order. Thus, compared with Mencius, Xunzi’s view of ren 
government involves more practical conditions: a ruler extends the benevolence to the 
people by preserving an orderly society with social ranks and hierarchy. In this case, 
although a ruler could not cultivate himself to become fully moral in a short time, he 
could at least meet the lowest standard of ren government while the achievement of 
the highest standard could be left to later. It seems that Xunzi recovered and 
developed Confucius’ teachings in this respect: we could not deem a ruler as not 
benevolent just because he did not achieve the highest level of ren; instead, we should 
see whether he has carried out some policies and kept a good social order for the 
benefit of the people. Once the people are benefited from such policies and good 
social order, the ruler could at least be regarded as having achieved the first step in 
attaining ren government. In this sense, we could say that such morally imperfect 
ruler could still contribute to the Confucian political ideal of good government. Thus, 
in comparison with Mencius, Xunzi’s teachings of ren government seem to be more 
plausible and realistic in the time of the late Warring States period, when most of the 
rulers were not concerned with moral cultivation. For Xunzi, the realization of the 
highest standard of good government just lies in the approaches for achieving the 
second-order good government.  
 
Li and Fa as the Approaches for Achieving Good Government 
Li—the Necessary Tool for Achieving a Good Government 
For Confucius, li is an important tool for securing a good social order and hierarchy. 
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Confucius hoped to apply li in instituting an ideal hierarchical order among ruler, 
minister and the people.23 For Confucius, the ruler, ministers and people all have their 
own social roles in a society, which means, they have their own duties for preserving 
a well-ordered society. They could not transgress their own duties, otherwise this 
would only result in chaos and disorder. For Confucius, li is just like a frame that 
regulates everyone’s duties and activities, securing a good social order. Confucius 
said, 
Do not look unless it is in accordance with the rites (li); do not listen unless it is 
in accordance with the rites; do not speak unless it is in accordance with the rites; 
do not move unless it is in accordance with the rites.24 
Li is an important principle for preserving the order between ruler and minister, ruler 
and the people, father and son, etc., without which, the society would fall into chaos.  
Besides, li not only has the prescriptive functions of regulating what we should 
or should not do, it also elicits our sense of shame if we disobey it, which in turn 
transforms ourselves to be moral. Confucius said, 
Guide them by virtue, keep them in line with the li, and they will, besides having 
a sense of shame, reform themselves.25  
However, for Confucius, even if a ruler could not cultivate himself to be moral 
through li in a short time, he could at least achieve a good social order governed by li, 
and this will benefit the people. In fact, for Confucius, even if a ruler or minister 
could not act according to the requirements of li, he could also be regarded as a 
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benevolent ruler or minister. In The Analects 3.22, Confucius condemned Guan Zhong, 
the prime minister of Qi state for not following li. However, in 14.16, Confucius 
praised Guan Zhong as benevolent since under his instruction, the people avoided war 
and enjoyed much benefit from Guan Zhong’s wise strategy. Confucius indeed 
regarded an official as benevolent if he could bring about actual benefit and welfare 
for the people, even if his own achievement in ren or li is not so perfect. As we can 
see in the following discussions, Xunzi followed Confucius’ teachings in this respect 
and developed it, while Mencius neglected this respect in Confucius’ teachings. 
In general, ren is more important than li for Mencius, and the two need not go 
together. Between the choice to obey the requirements of li or save the life of one’s 
sister-in-law, a person should choose the latter since it is more important (ren) to save 
a life.26 The neglect of li also extends to politics, and Mencius only persisted in the 
approach of moral persuasion for the ruler, that is, to persuade the ruler to be ren and 
extend his benevolence to the people. Actually, this approach later proved to be 
useless under the circumstances of the mid-late Warring States period. Mencius’ 
downgrading of li made the achievement of ren government hopeless.  
For Xunzi, ren government lies not only in the benevolence extended to the 
people, but also the normative social order and stable hierarchical structure. Xunzi 
regarded the achievement of normative social order as the first and most important 
step in achieving the ideal of ren government. To achieve the normative social order, 
Xunzi regarded li as the most important tool. Xunzi said, 
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Accordingly, the Ancient Kings acted to control them with regulations, ritual, 
and moral principles, in order thereby to divide society into classes, creating 
therewith differences in status between the noble and base, disparities between 
the privileges of age and youth, and the division of the wise from the stupid, the 
able from the incapable.27 
For Xunzi, li could preserve social order by specifying clear distinctions among the 
different social ranks. In Xunzi’s view, all people in a society have their own desires 
for material goods. If all of them hunt for what they desire without moderation, 
society will fall into a chaos. Thus, the sage king instituted li to distinguish the 
different social ranks so as to make the people at different ranks seek different things 
according to their ranks. So, once the people act according to li, not demanding 
anything beyond their ranks, the state would become orderly. As we can see, Xunzi 
did not expect a ruler to become benevolent enough to extend his treatment of his own 
family to others in a short time; instead, even if a ruler could not do so, once he could 
employ li in governing, he could become a good ruler and his government could 
become a good government. 
Although Xunzi stressed li as an important tool for achieving a good social order 
and in this sense, li could at least achieve the lowest standard of ren government, he 
did not forget the moral cultivation that li could elicit, which is the necessary 
approach for attaining the best government. Xunzi said, 
In the past, the Ancient Kings caused there to be sharp divisions and graded 
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differences. Hence, they caused some to be praised and others to be despised; 
some to be treated liberally, and others meagerly; some to have ease and 
enjoyment, and others a bitter and toilsome lot. They did not do this merely out 
of reckless extravagance or a boastful fondness for elegance, but rather they did 
so in order to brightly illuminate the forms and patterns of humaneness (ren) and 
to make comprehensible the obedience and accord required by humane (ren) 
principles.28 
So, in Xunzi’s view, ritual forms are the “forms and patterns” of ren, which is the 
ultimate purpose of moral cultivation for a Confucian. For Xunzi, li is different from 
ren in that it requires a person to do something in accordance with some formal and 
prescriptive codes, which appear as the external ritual forms and patterns, while ren 
requires a person to love others as an extension of love for their own families. Li is the 
means of achieving ren. The reason why li becomes necessary in achieving ren lies in 
li’s external forms that could be more easily followed while ren is a higher moral 
requirement that could not be easily seen and followed by the people.  
The humane (ren) man delights in proclaiming and manifesting it [ren] to others. 
If it is proclaimed and manifested, smoothed and polished, imitated and repeated, 
then the myopic will suddenly become comprehensive, the uncultivated suddenly 
refined, and the stupid suddenly wise.29  
For Xunzi, Only if ren is manifested as li, could it be imitated, exercised and 
achieved.  
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So, we may wonder why people would be willing to be guided by li. According 
to Xunzi, if everyone could follow the requirement of li, it could bring about actual 
benefits for them and all the other people. For example, if all people follow li in their 
everyday life, they would not fight against each other, which would bring about peace 
for the whole society. In fact, in Xunzi’s view, at first, it is the prescriptive function of 
li that constrains people, but after that, the consequences convince people that li could 
bring about benefits for them so that they are willing to follow it and transform their 
nature to be moral over time. If such prescriptive li could only bring about the 
privileges for the ruler, or those at the upper social classes, the people would not 
accept its guidance, even though it is imposed over a long period. Instead, in this case, 
they would more likely overturn such prescriptive li. So, for Xunzi, the reason why 
the prescriptive li could achieve ren lies in the people’s eventual realization that li 
could bring about long-term benefits for them.  
 
Fa/Xing—the Indispensable Tool for Securing a Good Government 
As a tool of government, li is contrasted with punishments or punitive laws (xing) in a 
famous passage from the Analects (2.3).  
Guide them by edicts, keep them in line with xing, and the common people will 
stay out of trouble but will have no sense of shame. Guide them by virtue, keep 
them in line with the li, and they will, besides having a sense of shame, reform 
themselves.30 
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Thus, although punitive law (xing) plays an important role in curbing crime and 
making people live without trouble, it apparently has nothing to do with moral 
cultivation. According to the usual reading of this passage, punishment could only 
force the people to act according to the laws but could not elicit the shameful feelings 
that promote self-regulation. If the people do not feel shameful for a crime, they may 
violate the law once again if they think they can get away with it. On the other hand, 
if people could be guided by li, they would feel deeply shameful of vicious behavior 
and not transgress even when there is no chance of discovery. Thus, for Confucius, 
law with punishments is not as useful and effective as li in guiding the people to 
become benevolent and keeping up a good social order. So, to apply li in governing 
and finally abandon the use of punitive laws is what Confucius hoped for.  
In hearing litigation, I am no different from any other man. But if you insist on a 
difference, it is, perhaps, that I try to get the parties not to resort to litigation in 
the first place.31 
In the view of Confucius, li should be prior to punishment, and without the guidance 
of li, punishment might be abused. Confucius said, 
When li and music do not flourish, xing fa (punishment) will not fit the crimes; 
when xing fa do not fit the crimes, the common people will not know where to 
put hand and foot.32 
Although Confucius argued for rituals rather than punitive law in governing a 
state and moral cultivation, he seemed to allow some room for punitive law in 
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governing a state. His position could be extended to allow for punitive law to act as a 
means to benevolence. As discussed before, Confucius praised Guan Zhong as 
benevolent since the latter had brought much benefit and welfare to the people. 
Although Confucius did not explicitly describe how Guan Zhong achieved such 
outcome, there are some clues from Guanzi, a book supposed to be compiled by Guan 
Zhong.33 In the Chapter Ren Fa (Reliance on Law), we read: 
The sage prince relies on established laws, not on expertise…The documents of 
the Zhou state: “If the laws of a country are inconsistent, whoever possesses such 
a country will be plagued by misfortune. Such will also be the case if his people 
do not obey the law, if his country changes its established laws to control its 
people,…and if his numerous officers and their assistants deviate from the law in 
attempting to establish good order.” Therefore it is said: “Law must remain 
constant. It is the determining factor as to whether one survives or perishes, has 
order or chaos….” Therefore it is called “fa 法.”34 
Thus, Guan Zhong emphasized fa as an important principle in securing a good social 
order. So, Guan Zhong’s benevolence lay in the fact that Guan Zhong had carried out 
a series of practical strategies including using the law to maintain an orderly society. 
In this case, even if Confucius did not think highly of fa as it does not have the 
                                                        
33 There are many different views of the authenticity of Guanzi. For example, Hu Shih argued that Guanzi was not 
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34 W. Allyn Rickett, Guanzi—Political, Economic, and Philosophical Essays from Early China, vol. 2 (New Jersey: 
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function of moral transformation, he could be seen to give indirect approval of Guan 
Zhong’s strategy of using fa to maintain an orderly society and to achieve ren 
government.  
It seems contradictory here as Confucius believed that xing with the implication 
of fa has nothing to do with moral cultivation. Here, we should note that Confucius 
never thought that Guan Zhong had conducted moral cultivation to be ren, even 
though the efficacy of his governing strategy indeed benefited the people. The reason 
why Guan Zhong could be regarded as ren is that the efficacy of his governing 
strategy is good for the people rather than that he was himself morally cultivated by fa. 
For Confucius, fa could not bring about moral transformation in a person, but it may 
contribute to the part of the efficacy that the ren government brings about.  
In the text of Xunzi, we find that fa and xing (punishment) are both crucial to 
good government. Fa is often translated as “model” or “moral model” by Knoblock in 
his translation of Xunzi. In this case, fa is normally understood as the moral model 
instead of some legal system. Besides the understanding of fa as moral model, there is 
another important interpretation of fa in the context of Xunzi, that is, the legal system 
or institution. Xunzi said, 
The reason that the model (fa) of the Three Dynasties still exists even though 
they have perished is that officers and bureaucrats have meticulously observed 
the rules and laws (fa), the weights and measures, criminal sanctions and 
penalties (xing), and maps and registers.35 
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For Xunzi, the reason why the moral model ancient sage kings created could exist in 
later generations lies in the officials’ insistence on rules and laws. That is to say, laws 
and rules could safeguard the moral model from being destroyed. In this sense, fa is 
indispensable in governing well. In fact, Xunzi regarded li and fa as two basic 
governing tools.  
If farmers divide up the land and plow it, if merchants divide up commodities 
and trade them, if the Hundred Craftsman divide up tasks and assist each 
other,…then the Son of Heaven need do no more than assume a gravely reverent 
attitude in his person…All these matters have been the same for all the Hundred 
Kings, and are the primary social divisions of ritual and of the model of law.36 
In Xunzi’s view, the main function of li and fa is to keep the social divisions stable in 
a society. So, how could fa keep the social divisions stable? For Xunzi, it is the 
intimidating function of fa that prevents people from transgressing legal or even ritual 
norms.37 If li could not make some people follow its norms, fa could rectify that by 
punishing those people who are not on the right track so that an orderly society could 
be secured. Thus, fa could also be regarded as an important tool for achieving a good 
government.  
If fa has the function of maintaining a good social order, could it bring about the 
moral transformation that Confucius and Mencius connects with li or ren? For Xunzi, 
fa not only compels the people to act according to it through coercive means, but also 
influences them to be moral so that they would stick to li more voluntarily. Xunzi 
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said, 
Governmental ordinances, edicts, regulations, and standards that are not in 
accord with reason by so much as the tip of a hair should not be applied to the 
Hundred Clans, much less to the utterly helpless—orphans, childless old people, 
widows, and widowers. ….Lord and minister, superior and inferior, noble and 
base, old and young, down to commoners—all should exalt this as the standard 
of rectitude. Only in this way will all examine themselves to ensure that they 
devote their attention to the tasks of their social class. In this all the Hundred 
Kings have been identical, and this principle forms the pivot and axis of all 
ritual principles and of the model for laws.38 
Thus, if the law is fair to all and protects their rights, it could motivate the people to 
reflect and realize that the stable social distinction would bring about actual benefits 
for them so that they would stick to the laws and ritual principles voluntarily. At first, 
fa simply acts as a set of prescriptive and compulsory laws constraining human 
behavior. But after some time, people would be prompted to reflect on themselves and 
become moral when they realize the importance and benefit of keeping up the stable 
social distinctions. In this sense, fa could have the similar transformational function of 
li. It could also influence the people to stick to the ritual principles and cultivate them 
to be moral. Xunzi said, 
     In antiquity the sage kings took man’s nature to be evil, to be inclined to 
prejudice and prone to error, to be perverse and rebellious, and not to be upright 
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or orderly. For this reason they invented ritual principles and precepts of moral 
duty. They instituted the regulations that are contained in laws (fa) and standards. 
Through these actions they intended to “straighten out” and develop man’s 
essential nature and to set his inborn nature aright. They sought to tame and 
transform his essential nature and to guide his inborn nature with the Way. They 
caused both his essential and inborn natures to develop with good order and be 
consistent with the true Way.39 
Thus, Xunzi regarded human nature as bad and so fa should be imposed on human 
nature so as to control the unruly emotions and desires in human nature to be moral. 
    Although she emphasizes the importance of differentiating rituals from laws in 
Confucianism, Sor-hoon Tan acknowledges the transformative possibility of laws and 
even punishments. 
One might start obeying a law to avoid penalties, but if the norm gives 
satisfaction, it could very well bring about the kind of transformation Confucians 
associate only with rites. For example, by repeatedly obeying a law against 
littering, I may develop a habit of not littering as well as come to appreciate the 
clean environment that results so much that I voluntarily will not litter even 
when I am in a country without such a law.40 
In this sense, besides securing the hierarchical order in a society in a prescriptive and 
compulsory sense, laws could transform the people to be moral at the same time. Joel 
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J. Kupperman also observed the importance of law in transforming a person’s 
character. He argues, 
Both Aristotle’s and Xunzi’s views on the role of law in the shaping of character 
(especially in the early stages) can be given a minimalist or a maximalist 
interpretation. The minimalist reading is that laws (along with parental and 
informal community encouragements and sanctions) have an important role in 
shaping the habits that are so important, especially in the early stages. One is 
very likely to develop the habit of not doing what is forbidden. A maximalist 
reading is that laws also embody ethical instructions, and in this are a form of 
modeling of what is desirable that normally will have ethical influence.41 
Xunzi did not divert Confucianism into Legalism just because of his insistence 
upon legal systems in governing, since his proposal of instituting a legal system is not 
only for maintaining an orderly society, but also for cultivating the people to be moral 
and modeling them to be gentlemen. In Xunzi’s view, fa could be applied in securing 
li and influencing people to be moral over time. In addition, li and punishment should 
be balanced in governing a state so that people could be cultivated to be moral and an 
orderly society could result. Xunzi retained Confucian tradition by resisting the 
Legalist view that the purpose of fa is only to control the people since their 
profit-loving nature cannot be transformed.  
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Wang and Ba 
Confucius’ View of Wang and Ba 
Confucian accommodation of non-ideal circumstances went beyond the acceptance of 
the important role of laws in government. Different Confucians adopting different 
attitudes in accepting the non-ideal generated the debates about true or moral kingship 
(wang) and hegemons (ba). In this, Xunzi extended Confucius’ tolerant attitude. 
Although Confucius hoped that a ruler could cultivate himself to be benevolent, he 
noticed the difficulty of becoming a sage king who is benevolent. He said, 
Even with a true king it is bound to take a generation for benevolence to become 
a reality.42 
To become benevolent is a painstaking process that needs effort and practice over a 
long period of time, which is very hard to achieve in one’s limited lifetime. So, for 
Confucius, even the ancient rulers, such as Yao and Shun, have trouble with 
sageliness.43 Confucius also denied that he was a sage. He said, 
How dare I claim to be a sage or a benevolent man? Perhaps it might be said of 
me that I learn without flagging and teach without growing weary.44 
Since the process of achieving ren and of becoming a sage is so hard, why did 
Confucius still persist in pursuing that goal? For Confucius, the ultimate moral and 
political ideal is to integrate moral cultivation with state governing. Although the way 
of achieving this goal is painstaking with slim hope of success, the process of 
achieving ren and sage king is itself valuable since it leads to the accumulating a lot 
                                                        
42 The Analects, 13.12. 
43 Refer to The Analects, 6.30. 
44 The Analects, 7.34, see also 9.6. 
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of worthy experiences that could be regarded as sustained improvement of oneself and 
of government. For Confucius, the more important thing may not be the final outcome, 
but the process. 
Confucius did not expect every ruler to become a sage king. He even admited 
that those rulers who were condemned by later Confucians as ba, hegemons who won 
large territories through military exploits and clever alliances, were good rulers in 
their own way. One example is Duke Huan, who was helped by Guan Zhong to 
become one of the five ba in the Spring and Autumn period.45  
 
Mencius’ View of Wang and Ba 
Compared with Confucius, Mencius seemed not so flexible in his attitude to the ba. 
Mencius emphasized that good governing only lies in wang instead of ba.46 
One who uses force while borrowing from benevolence will become leader of 
the feudal lords (ba), but to do so he must first be the ruler of a state of 
considerable size. One who puts benevolence into effect through the 
transforming influence of morality will become a true King (wang), and his 
success will not depend on the size of his state…When people submit to the 
                                                        
45 There are two views of who should be identified as the five ba: one side regards the Duke Huan of Qi, Duke 
Xiang of Song, Duke Wen of Jin, Duke Mu of Qin and King Zhuang of Chu; the other side regards the Duke Huan 
of Qi, Duke Wen of Jin, King Zhuang of Chu, King of Wu as He Lue, King of Yue as Gou Jian. Both sides regard 
the Duke Huan of Qi as one of the five ba.  
46 There are many disputations about Mencius’ view of wangba among the Song Confucians. One side, 
represented by Sima Guang 司馬光, Su Zhe 蘇轍 and Chen Liang 陳亮, argued that wang and ba in Mencius 
have not such distinction and the difference between wang and ba is only in the extent; however, the other side, 
represented by Wang Anshi 王安石, Zhang Jiucheng 張九成 and Zhu Xi 朱熹, argued that wang and ba are 
different in nature. In my view, the latter view seems more plausible as Mencius as a moral and political idealist 
certainly regarded wang as the ultimate ideal, while ba has no such moral properties that could be admired. As for 
the details of the disputation, see Huang Junjie 黃俊傑, Mengxue sixiang shilun 孟學思想史論, vol. 1 (Taipei: 
Dongda Publishing, 1991, pp. 443-452); also Huang Junjie 黃俊傑, Mengxue sixiang shilun 孟學思想史論, vol. 
2 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1997), pp. 143-155.     
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transforming influence of morality they do so sincerely, with admiration in their 
hearts.47 
For Mencius, a ruler must first cultivate himself to be benevolent enough to transform 
the people, and then he could be a true King. If an immoral ruler only uses force to 
seize the land of other people, he could not make the people submit to him voluntarily. 
He even regarded the achievement of Guan Zhong as insignificant.48  Mencius 
condemned the five ba as offenders against the Three Kings since they only used 
force to attack other states instead of extending benevolence in governance. But the 
five ba were better than the feudal lords in his time as they at least abide by alliances 
and curbed the vicious behavior and immoral conduct to keep up the peace among the 
states while the feudal lords at this time betrayed alliances and attacked each other 
unduly. 
The people under a ba are happy; those under a true King are expansive and 
content. They bear no ill-will when put to death, neither do they feel any 
gratitude when profited. They move daily towards goodness without realizing 
who it is that brings this about. A gentleman transforms where he passes, and 
works wonders where he abides. He is in the same stream as Heaven above and 
Earth below. Can he be said to bring but small benefit?49  
Although the people under the governance of ba may also benefit from ba, they 
could not be morally transformed as they would be under the governance of wang. 
Not always consistent, Mencius seemed to allow some room for ba to be cultivated to 
                                                        
47 Mencius, 2A3. 
48 Refer to Mencius, 2A1. 
49 Mencius, 7A13. 
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be moral. He said, 
Yao and Shun had it (benevolence) as their nature. Tang and King Wu embodied 
it. The Five ba borrowed it. But if a man borrows a thing and keeps it long 
enough, how can one be sure that it will not become truly his?50 
In the Lianghuiwang chapter, Mencius tried to persuade King Hui of Liang and King 
Xuan of Qi to share the materialistic goods and other benefits with the common 
people, even though the Kings had private materialistic desires for more goods and 
other benefits.51 For Mencius, even if a ruler is immoral in his private desires, so long 
as he could share his benefits with the common people, he could be transformed to be 
a benevolent ruler. It remained for Xunzi to develop a more consistent Confucian 
attitude towards the ba. 
 
Xunzi’s View of Wang and Ba 
Xunzi argued that, since human xing is bad, the ruler is no exception in this regard. 
This leads to a more positive attitude towards the ba. For John Knoblock, Xunzi had 
two views about wang and ba during different stages of his career.52 In writing the 
book of Zhong Ni early in his career, Xunzi seemed to only argue for the way of wang 
in governing while condemning ba. Xunzi said, 
Even an immature lad from the gate of Confucius would be ashamed to praise 
the Five Lords-Protector (ba) in his discourse. Why is this? I say it is because 
                                                        
50 Mencius, 7A30. 
51 See Mencius, 1A2, 1B4 and 1B5. 
52 Refer to the Introduction to Book 7 and 11, in Xunzi, vol. 2. 
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such men truly can only make one ashamed to praise them.53 
So, at this time, Xunzi condemned ba since it was not following moral principles in 
governing a state. Thus, “Xunzi is fully in accord with Mencius, who refused to 
discuss the lords-protector with King Xuan of Qi because ‘none of the followers of 
Confucius spoke’ of them.”54 What Xunzi proclaimed as the model for rulers is that 
of the True King, wang.  
True Kings (wang) are not at all like this. Being the worthiest of men, they are 
able to help the unworthy. Being the strongest of men, they are able to be 
magnanimous toward the weak.55 
In Xunzi’s earlier view, only if a ruler adhered to moral principles and Confucian way, 
could he be regarded as a True King, who could be the moral exemplar for all rulers.  
It is possible that his experience and the politics of his day led to a mature view 
that is more positive towards the ba. In the book of Wang Ba, Xunzi first classified 
three kinds of rulers: 
One who uses the state to establish justice will be king (wang); one who 
establishes trust will be a lord-protector (ba); and one who establishes a record of 
expediency and opportunism will perish.56 
In Xunzi’s view, a ruler who could put the rituals into political practice could be 
regarded as a true King. This kind of ruler is Xunzi’s political and moral ideal, which 
could be identified as Tang and Wu in reality. Nevertheless, even if a ruler could not 
                                                        
53 Xunzi, vol. 2, 7.1. 
54 Xunzi, vol. 2, p. 53.  
55 Xunzi, vol. 2, 7.1. 
56 Xunzi, vol. 2, 11.1a. 
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act according to the ritual principles, once he establishes the governing order in a state 
and the trust among the states, he could be called a lord-protector, that is, ba. Xunzi 
said, 
Although the moral force of their inner power had not yet reached perfection and 
although moral principles had not yet been fully attained, yet, in a general way, 
they displayed rational principles for ordering the world…Although from 
despised and backward countries, their majestic authority shook the whole world. 
Such were the Five Lords-Protector (ba).57 
For Xunzi, although these five ba had not achieved the highest virtue possible for 
rulers, by establishing trust among the states and strengthening their own states, they 
could benefit their people. Here, Xunzi did not condemn the five ba or deny their 
accomplishments. Xunzi condemned only the third kind of ruler who fails to benefit 
the people at all.  
In Qiang Guo chapter, Xunzi discussed the situation of the Qin state with regard 
to the difference between wang and ba. When he was asked about his impression of 
Qin state, which could be regarded as an example of ba, Xunzi at first praised Qin: 
“its defenses at the border barriers have a natural strength of position. Its 
topographical features are inherently advantageous.” And more important, 
When I passed across the border, I noted that the customs and mores of the 
Hundred Clans were unspoiled…I saw the Hundred Officials sternly attend to 
their functions, none failing to be respectful, temperate, earnest, scrupulously 
                                                        
57 Xunzi, vol. 2, 11.1c. 
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reverential, loyal, and trustworthy, and never being deficient in the execution of 
their duties—just as were the officers of antiquity.58 
Nevertheless, after acknowledging a list of achievements of the Qin government, 
Xunzi criticized Qin for its lack of Ru scholars. 
…it is dangerously lacking in Ru scholars. Thus, it is said: Those who possess 
the pure form are True Kings (wang); those who have the mixed form are 
lords-protector (ba); those who lack any at all are annihilated. This is precisely 
the shortcoming of Qin.59 
The lack of Ru scholars means that Qin did not fully apply the Confucian 
principle in governing. Thus, Xunzi certainly regarded the true King, that is, wang, as 
more admirable than ba who is not cultivated by Confucian moral principles. 
However, ba is very much needed in the time of the late Warring States period as it 
could provide a stable society and state for the people. In fact, ba might be the 
preparing stage for achieving the governing of wang in the late Warring States period. 
As analyzed before, under the instruction of fa, which is the fundamental governing 
principle of ba, the people could also be transformed to be moral. Thus, Xunzi 
discovered an innovative approach to achieve the Confucian political ideal of wang. 
This is a significant contribution to the political teachings of Confucianism.  
In comparison with Mencius, Xunzi allowed some room for the not perfectly 
moral ruler who could still benefit the people. That is to say, li and fa should both be 
emphasized as instruments of governing. Only when the society and state are stable 
                                                        
58 Xunzi, vol. 2, 16.6. 
59 Xunzi, vol. 2, 16.6. 
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and orderly is it more likely that the people would conduct moral cultivation to lead to 
the moral ideal of ren. In Xunzi’s time, without the governing of ba, a state could not 
even survive in a time of chaos, let alone unify the whole empire. In addition, during 
the governing of ba, the people could benefit from the strength and prosperity of a 
state. This is not a total departure from Confucius’ tolerant attitude towards Duke 
Huan and Guan Zhong.  
 
Shang Yang’s Influence in Terms of Fa and Ba 
As both Xunzi and Shang Yang regarded human xing as profit-loving, they both 
argued for the importance of law in controlling human xing and crafting an orderly 
society. Shang Yang said, 
Therefore is an intelligent ruler cautious with regard to laws (fa) and regulations 
and placing reliance on men of fame and reputation; he does not hearken to 
words, which are not in accordance with the law; he does not exalt actions, 
which are not in accordance with the law; he does not perform deeds, which are 
not in accordance with the law.60 
Xunzi also said, 
The reason that the model (fa) of the Three Dynasties still exists even though 
they have perished is that officers and bureaucrats have meticulously observed 
the rules and laws (fa), the weights and measures, criminal sanctions and 
penalties (xing), and maps and registers.61 
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61 Xunzi, vol. 1, 4.7. 
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However, the primary concern of Shang Yang was to devise some kind of law and 
regulatory system to rule the people instead of cultivating them morally. For Xunzi, 
even if we could have an orderly society and stable state through the legal systems, 
we could not establish the highest level of good government without moral cultivation. 
When li and fa are both assumed, they could first instruct the people what they should 
and should not do; then they could transform them to be moral over a period of time. 
In this respect, Xunzi was different from Shang Yang.  
For Shang Yang, once a government carries out laws and regulations fully, and 
the people could follow the course that government institutes, it could be called a 
good government. In this respect, the position of the people is not as important as that 
of government and law. In fact, the people might even be treated as a tool of the 
government in concentrating the power of the state and accumulating wealth and 
military strength in the state.62 
Xunzi, however, argued for a different view in terms of good governance. For 
Xunzi, laws and regulations are not the total content of governing; instead, aside from 
laws and regulations, li should be emphasized as the fundamental principle of 
governing. For Xunzi, li could transform human emotions and desires to be moral. In 
fact, even for fa, Xunzi also argued for its possibility of transforming humans to be 
moral. So, for Xunzi, a good government lies not only in the good social order li and 
fa could bring about, but also in the moral transformation of the people.  
Some would argue, erroneously, that it is Xunzi who diverted Confucianism into 
                                                        
62 See Duyvendak, The Book of Lord Shang, p. 207. 
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Legalism incorporating law into his theory of good government. However, they did 
not realize that the goal of law is to serve the humanistic purposes in the context of 
Xunzi. It is just as Chung-Ying Cheng observes in an article, 
We see that Confucianists never question the importance of fa in the general 
sense. A government will not be organized and function without its structure of 
rules or organization. Similarly, a society will not be in order if there is no 
normative sanction and prohibition. But the Confucianist would insist that for 
introducing any organization in government and norm in society, one must 
understand that such an organization and norm will serve the general humanistic 
and humanitarian purposes. It should preserve man as a self-fulfilling individual 
and society as a network for preserving and fulfilling humanity.63 
Thus, in sharp contrast with Shang Yang, humanity for Xunzi is the final purpose 
while laws and regulations are the tool. Due to their different concerns, we could 
absolutely say that Xunzi remained within the Confucian tradition even though he 
improved Confucianism by incorporating some elements from Legalism. 
Xunzi’s account of ba also sounds familiar when we examine the text of Shang 
Jun Shu. 
So, too, the Three Kings (wang) conciliated people by righteousness and the five 
Lords Protector (ba) rectified the feudal lords by law; that is, in all these cases, 
none took for himself the benefits of the empire. They ruled for the sake of the 
empire, and thus, when those who held positions had corresponding merit, the 
                                                        
63  Chung-Ying Cheng, “Legalism Versus Confucianism: A Philosophical Appraisal,” Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy, Vol. 8 (1981), pp.297 -298. 
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empire enjoyed their administration and no one could harm it. But nowadays, 
princes and ministers of a disorderly world each, on a small scale, appropriates 
the profits of his own state, and each exercised the burden of his own office, for 
his private benefit. This is why the states are in a perilous position. For the 
relation between public and private interests is what determines existence or 
ruin.64 
Thus, in Shang Yang, wang and ba have the common merits in governance, that is, the 
concern for the whole empire instead of themselves. Among them, wang governs with 
yi, while ba governs with fa. Although they are different in choosing the way of 
governing, their purposes are similar. That is, to preserve an orderly society and good 
government. For Shang Yang, what should be avoided is the ruler who only acquires 
the private benefit for himself. Xunzi was strikingly similar to Shang Yang in the view 
of wang and ba in that he regarded not only wang, but also ba as an acceptable way of 
governing. For Xunzi, the bad ruler who is “one who establishes a record of 
expediency and opportunism” resembles the kind of ruler Shang Yang condemned — 
one who “appropriates the profits of his own state, and each exercised the burden of 
his own office, for his private benefit.”  
 
Conclusion 
Xunzi attempted to solve the problem of what the government should do if the people 
are not willing to learn li and fa by borrowing from Legalism. For Xunzi, even if the 
                                                        
64 Duyvendak, The Book of Lord Shang, pp. 263-264. 
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people are not willing to learn li and fa, the government could still carry out li and fa 
as a set of prescriptive rules and regulations, enforced by punishments, to control 
human behavior and preserve an orderly society. In Xunzi’s view, li and fa can go 
beyond controlling people’s behavior to serve as tools for cultivating people to 
become moral. Compared with Mencius, Xunzi was more realistic in advocating li 
and fa. Both Confucius and Mencius neglected the important transformational 
function of fa and this is the reason why they did not regard fa as the approach for 
achieving the highest standard of ren government.  
Xunzi argued for the combination of li and fa, wang and ba in governing, which 
is more adaptable to the realities of the late Warring States period. Xunzi’s views of li 
and fa, wang and ba were probably influenced by the teachings of Shang Yang which 
argues for the importance of fa and ba in his time. Xunzi assimilated some teachings 
about fa and ba from Shang Yang and modified their intended purposes so as to meet 
Confucian needs. In this respect, Xunzi adopted non-Confucian teachings in order to 
solve the problems in the political teachings of former Confucianism and to 
reconstruct Confucianism in the late Warring States period.  
I have tried to show how Xunzi integrated some non-Confucian teachings into 
his own Confucian philosophy so as to strengthen Confucian theories of knowing, 
human nature and politics in order to reconstruct Confucianism. I hope I have shown 
how and to what extent non-Confucian teachings could be helpful in improving 
Confucianism. It is an aim of this dissertation to encourage more attention to this 
topic, that is, the comparison between the non-Confucian teachings and Confucianism, 
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from which, we might see not only how non-Confucian teachings could improve 
Confucianism, but also how Confucianism could be helpful in improving 
non-Confucian teachings. The in-depth study of the comparison between 
non-Confucian teachings and Confucianism would help us gain a deeper 
understanding of these once flourishing philosophers and their teachings in ancient 
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